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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 is a study of Quine's well-known thesis that it is
illicit to quantify into opaque constructions. In Section 1.1,
I attempt to distinguish between the notions of a purely
referential occurrence of a singular term and the referential
transparency of the position of the occurrence of a singular
term, and characterize Quine's thesis in the light of this dis-
tinction. It appears that if Quine's thesis is true, then
sentences such as
(3x) It is necessary that x is odd,
(3x) Ralph believes that x is a spy,
and
(3x) Sometime in the past x was a Catholic,
involve illicit quantification into referentially opaque con-
structions. In Section 1.2, I examine proposals for formulating,
without violating Quine's thesis, the thoughts which are
apparently formulated in these sentences. I argue that though
some of these proposals are successful, they have consequences
which strongly suggest that Quine's thesis is false. In Section
1.3, I examine two types of argument in defence of Quine's thesis,
and attempt to show that these arguments are unsuccessful in
establishing Quine's thesisq,
Chapter 2 is a study of the notion of parthood. I examine
three characterizations of this notion which are found in the
intended interpretations of the Leonard-Goodman Calculus of
Individuals, a tensed analogue of the Leonard-Goodman Calculus of
Individuals, and Thomson's Cross-temporal Calculus of Individuals
respectively; and I discuss problems arising from the loss or
acquisition of parts which these three characterizations face.
Thesis Supervisor; George Boolos
Professor of Philosophy
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QUANTIFICATION AND OPACITY
Over the past forty years, Quine has repeatedly claimed
that it is illicit to quantify into opaque constructions. In
a paper of 1943, Quine wrote: 'No pronoun (or variable of
quantification) within an opaque context can refer back to an
antecedent (or quantifier) prior to that context.' This is
one of the central claims of many of Quine's papers, including
'The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic', 'Reference and
Modality', and 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement'; and it
occupies a large part of the discussion in chapters IV, V, and
VI of Word and Object.
Quine's claim, that it is illicit to quantify into opaque
constructions, should not be confused with his misgivings about
essentialism, i.e. the thesis that among the traits of an object
some are essential to it, and others not, which he thinks
quantified modal logic is committed to; nor should Quine's claim
be confused with his more recent doubts about certain epistemo-
logical doctrines that he thinks that quantified logic of belief
is committed to.
Quine's claim is a claim about quantification in general.
It seems to be his view that there is a purely technical
1
'Notes On Existence & Necessity', Journal of Philosophy,
1943
8difficulty - a difficulty that can be established on purely
logical and semantic considerations - that quantification into
opaque constructions faces. Thus in 'Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes', after Quine has distinguished the
relational senses of propositional attitudes from their
corresponding notional senses, he notes:
'However, the suggested formulations of the
relational senses - viz.,
(3x)(x is a lion. Ernest strives that Ernest
finds x)
(3x)(x is a sloop. I wish that I have x)
(3x)(Ralph believes that x is a spy)
(3x)(Witold wishes that x is a president)
all involve quantifying into a propositional-
attitude idiom from outside. This is a dubious
business.' 2
The rest of that paper is an attempt to offer reconstruals of
the relational senses of propositional attitudes which do not
2'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', reprinted in
Reference & Modality, ed. Leonard Linsky (Oxford, 1971), pp. 102-3
involve quantifying into opaque constructions. And in his more
recent paper 'Intensions Revisited', having noted that quantified
modal logic also involves the allegedly illicit quantifying into
opaque constructions, he offers a reconstrual of quantified
modal discourse which is free from this alleged defect.
In section (1.1) of this paper I present a general
characterization of referential opacity and a statement of
Quine's thesis. In section (1.2) I examine some attempts to
render quantification into modal, epistemic, and temporal
constructions compatible with Quine's thesis. In section (1.3),
I examine some arguments for Quine's thesis. I argue that these
arguments are inconclusive and that though some of the attempts
at reconstrual examined in section (1.2) are successful, these
attempts also provide reasons for rejecting Quine's thesis.
10
1.1 REFERENTIAL OPACITY
Quine's characterization of referential opacity employs
the notion of a purely referential position which, in turn, is
explained by appeal to a principle that Quine has called 'the
principle of substitutivity'.3 Quine fonnulates this principle
in these words: '..., given a true statement of identity, one
of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true
statement and the resulL will be true.' Making allowances for
Quine's use of the word 'statement', this principle may be
understood as the claim that
(A) for all expressions a and s, if %a=r' expresses a
true proposition, then for any sentences S and S', if
S contains an occurrence of a and S' is the result of
substituting g for some occurrence of a in S, then S
expresses a true proposition only if S' expresses a
true proposition.5
It should be recognized, as Quine has frequently stressed, that
See Word and Object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 142,144
From a Logical Point of View, second edition, (Harper
and Row, 1963), p. 139
'This formulation is derived from one of Richard
Cartwright's in 'Identity and Substitutivity' in Identity and
Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz, (New York, 1971)
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(A) is false. For example, the propositions expressed by
(1) Giorgione = Barbarelli,
and
(2) 'Giorgione' contains nine letters,
are true, whereas
(3) 'Barbarelli' contains nine letters,
which is the result of substituting 'Barbarelli' for an occur-
rence of 'Giorgione' in (2), expresses a false proposition.
Similarly,
(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size,
expresses a true proposition, but
(5) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size,
does not, even though (5) is the result of substituting
'Barbarelli' for an occurrence of the co-referential 'Giorgione'
in (4). Counterexamples to (A) are not confined to those cases
which involve substitution within contexts of quotation. For
instance, though
(6) 9 = the number of planets,
12
and
(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd,
both express true propositions,
(8) It is necessary that the number of planets is odd,
does not; and likewise, though
(9) Hesperus = Phosphorus,
and
(10) It is an astronomical discovery that Herperus =
Phosphorus,
both express true propositions,
(11) It is an astronomical discovery that Hesperus =
Hesperus
does not express a true proposition.
The temptation to think that (A) is true might arise from
a failure to distinguish (A) from another principle, i.e.
(B) (Vz)(Vx)(Vy)[x=y -+ (z is a property of x -+ z is a
property of y)].
But it is important to recognize that whereas the proposition
13
that sentences (1) and (4) express true propositions and (5)
fails to express a true proposition falsifies (A), it does not
falsify (B); and therefore, (B) does not entail (A).6
Although Quine has frequently argued against (A), the
tendency to think that (A) is, after all, true may be encouraged
by some of his remarks. For instance, in 'Reference and Modality',
Quine writes: 'The principle of substitutivity should not be
extended to contexts in which the name to be supplanted occurs
without referring simply to the object'. Now (A), the principle
of substitutivity, makes a claim about all expressions and all
sentences, and it simply makes no sense to say that the principle
should not be extended to such and such contexts. Presumably
it is thought that some principle of substitutivity the range of
whose variables is suitably restricted is true. But it is worth
stressing that the existence of such a principle is not relevant
to the status of (A).
Some seem to find reason for affirming (A) in the observation
that first-order logic with identity licenses intersubstitut-
ability of co-referential terms. For example, Ruth Marcus
claims: 'Substitutivity may be taken as a rule of derivation
in first-order logic with identity. In the absence of quantifi-
6A proposition x falsifies a proposition y if and only
if x is true and x entails the denial of y.
cf. Quine, loc. cit., p. 139
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cation over properties, the principle of indiscernibility 8
comes to the set of those valid sentences that are the assoc-
iated conditionals of the rule of substitutivity for each of
the predicates of the theory. Alternatively, (Ind) may be
taken as definitive of identity in second-order logic, and
the principle of substitutivity falls out metatheoretically.
Anyone who claims that substitutivity does not govern identity
but that indiscernibility does must wonder why this is not so
in formal languages.' 9
If a and P are singular terms and S and S' are sentences
of a first-order language such that S contains an occurrence
of a and S' is the result of substituting P for an occurrence
of a in S, then a universal closure of ra=p -+ (S + S')' is a
sentence of a first-order language which is associated with the
rule of substitutivity. Counterexamples to (A) show that not
all of these sentences of a first-order language are true. For
example,
(12) Hesperus = Phosphorus + (It is an astronomical
discovery that Hesperus = Phosphorus - It is an
astronomical discovery that Hesperus = Hesperus)
8Marcus formulates what she calls 'the principle of
indiscernibility' or '(Ind)' as:
If a=b then every property of a is a property of b.
Ruth B. Marcus: 'Does the Principle of Substitutivity
Rest on a Mistake?'.
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is a false sentence of a first-order language which is asscc-
iated with the rule of substitutivity.
There is, however, a class of these sentences which
deserves attention. It consists of those universal closures
of ra=P -+ (S -+ S')' where a, and P are variables, S contains a
free occurrence of a and S' is the result of replacing some
free occurrence of a in S with a free occurrence of 3. (B), i.e.
(Vz) (Vx) (Vy) (x=y + (z is a property of x + z is a
property of y))
is a member of this class; so is
(Vz)(Vx)(Vy)(x=y + (z is a friend of x - z is a
friend of y)).10
If
(13) (Vx)(Vy)(x-y + (Fx -+ Fy))
is thought of as a schema, then members of this class are the
universal closures of instances of (13) or a notational variant
of (13). Quine describes (13) as a principle of substitutivity
of variables and argues in its defence as follows:
10 These examples are from Richard Cartwright:
'Indiscernibility Principles', in Mtddest Studies in Philosophy.
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(13) does have the air of a law; one feels that any
interpretation of 'Fx' violating (13) would be simply
a distortion of the manifest intent of 'Fx'. Anyway I
hope one feels this, for there is good reason to. Since
there is no quantifying into opaque construction, the
positions of 'x' and 'y' in 'Fx' and 'Fy' must be
referential if 'x' and 'y' in these positions are to be
bound by the initial '(Vx)' and '(Vy)' of (13) at all.
Since the notation of (13) manifestly intends the
quantifiers to bind 'x' and 'y' in all four shown places,
any interpretation of 'Fx' violating (13) would be a
distortion.11
Now, even if one were to disagree with the details of Quine's
argument, it should be recognized that no instance of (13) is
false. The temptation to think that (13) has false instances
might arise, again from a failure to distinguish (A) from what
is intended to be expressed by (13). But notice that unlike
(A), an instance of (13) is false only if there is a sequence,
and an expression F such that the relevant elements in the
sequence (i.e. those assigned to 'x' and 'y' respectively) are
W1ord and Object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 167, 168.
I have changed the notation and the numbering to conform to this
essay.
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identical, the sequence satisfies rFxn, and it fails to satisfy
rFyn. Clearly it does not follow from every proposition which
falsifies (A) that there is such a sequence. Indeed, it is
difficult to see that there can be such a sequence. For suppose
that a sequence satisfies rFxn. Then, the element of the sequence
assigned to 'x' is in the extension of F. But if the element of
the sequence assigned to 'x' is identical with the element of the
sequence assigned to 'y', then the element of the sequence assigned
to 'y' is in the extension of F, and hence the sequence satisfies
Now it is not clear to me as to how one is to understand
Marcus' remark that 'in the absence of quantification over pro-
perties, the principle of indiscernibility comes to the set of
those valid sentences that are the associated coaditionals of
the rule of substitutivity for each of the predicates of the
theory.' Marcus formulates what she calls 'the principle of
indiscernibility' or '(Ind)' as
If a=b then every property of a is a property of b.
Assuming that 'a' and 'b' are being used here as variables, one
would quite naturally see the universal closure of this sentence
as articulating the proposition expressed in (B). If we are right
in understanding Marcus' principle of indiscernibility in this way,
we may reformulate her remark as:
18
(i) In a first-order theory, (B) comes to the set
of those sentences of the theory which are the
universal closures of instances of (13).
It is still far from clear what (i) means. Marcus does not give
any indication about how the expression 'comes to' is to be
interpreted. Even if sense is given to this expression which
renders (i) true, I do not see how (i)'s being true is any evi-
dence for (A) or for Marcus' suggestion that substitutivity
governs identity in formal languages. Perhaps, after all, the
thought is that (13) implies (A); for, if that is true, we have
a strong argument in defence of (A). But that thought, I have
tried to argue, is simply false.12
Marcus' remark that 'alternatively, (Ind) may be taken as
definitive of identity in second-order logic, and the principle
of substitutivity falls out metatheoretically' suggests that it
was wrong to construe her principle of indiscernibility (Ind) as
(B), since (B) is not even a second order sentence. Notwithstanding
her own formulation, perhaps, Marcus should be seen as drawing
attention to either
(ii) (VF)(Vx)(Vy)(x=y + (Fx -+ Fy))
1Also see Richard Cartwright: 'Indiscernibility
Principles' in Midwest Studies in Philosophy.
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or the schema
(iii) (VF)(a=p + (Fa -+ F@))
in which 'F' as in (ii) is a second-order variable, but 'a'
and 'P' are schematic letters to be replaced by names in an
instance of (iii). Now (ii), as well as every instance of
(iii), is a valid second-order sentence, but it seems that
(ii) cannot be taken as definitive of identity since the range
of the first-order variables in (ii) must constitute a set or
a class.13 Secondly, no general principle of substitutivity,
such as (A), falls out, metatheoretically, of either (ii) or
(iii). (ii) indeed licenses instances of (13), but as we have
already seen, that instances of (13) are true is irrelevant to
(A).
Quine takes the falsity of (A) as evidence that an occur-
rence of some singular term in a sentence is not purely refer-
ential. For instance, in 'Reference and Modality', he writes:
'Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence
to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the
statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the
1See George Boolos: 'Second-Order Logic', Journal of
Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp. 509-526.
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name.1 4  And, in the same essay, he notes: the failure of
substitutivity shows that the occurrence of the personal
name in (4) is not purely referential. These remarks would
indicate that Quine takes the following principle (C) to
be true:
(C) For any sentence S, and any singular term a, and
any z, z is a purely referential occurrence of a
in S, only if, for any sentence S', and any
singular term B, if S' is the result of substitut-
ing S for z in S and a=a expresses a true propo-
sition then S expresses a true proposition if and
only if S' expresses a true proposition.
Since (1) and (4) express true propositions, and (5) does not
express a true proposition, if (C) is true, then the occurrence
of 'Giorgione' in (4) and the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5)
are not purely referential. Similarly, since (6) and (7) express
true propositions and (8) does not express a true proposition,
if (C) is true, then the occurrences of '9' and 'the number of
planets' in (7) and (8) respectively are both not purely refer-
ential. It is worth stressing that (C) is a very strong prin-
ciple - that if (C) is true, then it is also true that
1From a Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, New York)
p. 140.
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(D) for any sentence S and S', and any singular
terms a and P, and any z, if z is an occurrence
of a in S and S' is the result of substituting
@ for z in S, then, ra=P' expresses a true
proposition and rS -+ S'1 does not express a
true proposition then z and the corresponding
occurrence of p in S' are both not purely refer-
ential.
Though there is evidence that Quine would endorse (C),
there is also evidence that he does not intend (C) to be taken
as part of a definition of 'a purely referential occurrence'.
But if (C) is not to be taken as defining 'a purely referential
occurrence' then we are owed an account of what this expression
means. It seems to me that in discussions of referential opacity
it is often too readily granted that we know what it is for an
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence to be purely refer-
ential. Quine has, at times, described a purely referential
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence as an occurrence of
a singular term 'used in a sentence purely to specify its ob-
ject. ,15
15 Word and object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 142
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And Kaplan offers the following as a definition:
'(1) A purely designative occurrence of a singular
term a in a formula # is one in which a is
used solely to designate the object.,16
But if (i) is a definition, then there simply are no purely
designative (referential) occurrences of any singular term
in a sentence, for no term in a sentence is used solely to
designate (refer to) its object. After all, singular terms
are also used in a sentence to complete the sentence.
Quine's remark that 'failure of substitutivity reveals
merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely
referential, that is, that the statement depends not only on
the object but on the form of the name'17 may appear more
helpful. Presumably the thought is that the only contribution
that a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in a
sentence makes towards determining the truth-value of that
sentence is the specification of the object that it refers to.
One might then propose to define a purely referential occurrence
of a singular term in a sentence as follows:
16 --1'A Historical Note on Quine's Argument Concerning
Substitution and Quantification'
1Frvm a Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, 1963), p. 140
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(E') For any sentence S, and any non-vacuous singular
term a, and any z, z is a purely referential
occurrence of a in S, if and only if, for any S',
if S' is the result of substituting, for z in S,
a variable which does not occur in S, then S ex-
presses a true proposition if and only if whatever
z refers to satisfies S'.
(E') accords with some of our intuitions about the concept of a
referential occurrence. If (E') is true then the first
occurrence of 'Giorgione' in 'Giorgione was called 'Giorgione'
because of his size' is purely referential since 'Giorgione was
called 'Giorgione' because of his size' expresses a true
proposition if and only if for any variable a, Giorgione
satisfies ra was called 'Giorgione' because of his size'. On
the other hand, given (E'), the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in
(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size
is not purely referential. Surely we want to say that for any
variable a, Giorgione does not satisfy ra was so-called because
of his size". a was so-called because of his size', for any
variable a, is not a kind of sentence that anything satisfies,
and hence Giorgione does not satisfy it; but (4) expresses a
true proposition and hence if CE') is ture, the occurrence of
'Giorgione' in (4) is not purely referential.
24
However, it should be noted that an advocate of (C)
is in no position to endorse (E'). Surely we also want to
say that for any variable a, Barbarelli does not satisfy
a was so-called because of his size" a was so-called
because of his size", for any variable a, is not a kind
of sentence that anything satisfies, and hence Barbarelli
does not satisfy it; but
(5) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size
does not express a true proposition, and hence if (E') is
true, the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is purely
referential. But since unlike (5), (4) and
(1) Giorgione = Barbarelli
express true propositions, if (C) is true, the occurrence
of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is not purely referential; and hence,
if (E') is true, (C) is not true.
It would seem that our present difficulty arises because
for any variable a, ra was so-called because of his size" is not
18
an open sentence. This suggests that we should revise (E')
18 r
If for any variable a, a was so-called because of his
size1 is not an open sentence, then, either the usual character-
ization of an open sentence as a sentence which contains an
unbound (free) occurrence of a variable is incorrect, or the
25
as follows:
(E'') For any sentence S, and any non-vacuous singular
term a, and any z, z is a purely referential
occurrence of a in S, if and only if, for any
S', if S' is the result of substituting, for z
in S, a variable which does not occur in S,
then S' is an open sentence, and, S expresses
a true proposition if and only if whatever z
refers to satisfies S'.
Now, unlike (E'), (E'') is not in conflict with (C). It is not
true that if (5) does not express a true proposition and
Barbarelli does not satisfy a was so-called because of his
size1 , for any variable a, then (E'') is true only if the
occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is purely referential. A
further condition needs to be met in order for the occurrence
usual syntactic characterization of bondage, i.e. that an
occurrence of a variable a in a sentence S is bound if and
only if there is a variable-binding operator I such that
this occurence of a is in a part of S of the form F(Ia)S' ,
is incorrect. But, if these syntactic characterizations
are incorrect, how are we to understand the notion of an
open sentence and the related notion of a bound occurrence
of a variable? I shall argue that Quine's thesis, i.e. H,
offers an answer, though one which is incorrect, to these
questions.
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of 'Barbarelli' in (5) to be purely referential, i.e. that for
any variable a, ra was so-called because of his size' is an
open sentence; - and surely we are inclined to say that that is
not the case.
Now though (E'') is not in conflict with (C), it has
another consequence which deserves attention. Consider for
instance the following sentence:
(i) It is possible that the number of planets
is odd.
We are inclined to say that the occurrence of 'the number of
planets' in (i) is not purely referential. But if (E'') is true,
and the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i) is not
purely referential then
(ii) It is possible that x is odd
is not an open sentence. For, suppose, (ii) is an open sentence.
Then surely, 9, the number of planets, satisfies it, and since
(i) expresses a true proposition, if (E'') is true, the occurrence
of 'the number of planets' in (i) is purely referential.
Hence if we are inclined to say that (ii) is an open sentence,
and also that the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i)
is not purely referential, we had better reject CE''). But even
27
if here we have grounds for rejecting (E''), these are not
grounds for rejecting the following principle which is
implied by (E'').
(E) For any sentence S, and any non-vacuous
singular term a, and any z, z is a purely
referential occurrence of a in S, only if,
for any S', if S' is the result of sub-
stituting, for z in S, a variable which
does not occur in S, then S' is an open
sentence, and, S expresses a true proposition
if and only if whatever z refers to satisfies
S'.
It is worth noting that (E) is a weaker principle than (C).
Unlike (C), (E) does not guarantee the truth of (D). However,
if (E) is true, then it is also true that
(D') for any sentences S and S', and any singular terms
a and P, and any z, if z is an occurrence of a in
S, and S' is the result of substituting P for z
in S, then ra=pn expresses a true proposition and
rS S,, does not express a true proposition, then
either z or the corresponding occurrence of pB in S'
is not purely referential.
28
Consider, for instance, sentences (6), (7), and (8). Since
(6) expresses a true proposition, for any variable a, 9
satisfies rIt is necessary that a is odd'if and only if the
number of planets satisfies it. But since (7) expresses a true
proposition, and (8) does not express a true proposition, if
(E) is true then either the occurrence of '9' in (7) or the
occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (8) is not purely
referential. Of course, if rIt is necessary that a is odd3 ,
for any variable a, is not an open sentence then the occur-
rences of '9' in (7) and of 'the number of planets' in (8)
both fail to be purely referential. But it does not follow
from (E) (or from (E) and the fact that (6) and (7) express
true propositions and (8) does not) that "It is necessary
that a is odd', for any variable a, is not an open sentence.
Now (E) is in conflict with some of Quine's remarks about
the concept of a purely referential occurrence. Apparently
Quine19 thinks that not only (C) is true, but the following
stronger principle (C') is true as well:
(C') For any sentence S, and any singular term a, and
any z, z is a purely referential occurrence of a
in S, if and only if, for any sentence S', and any
19 Fom a Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, 1963),
pp. 140, 141
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singular term p, if S' is the result of sub-
stituting P for z in S and "a=p' expresses a
true proposition, then S expresses a true
proposition if and only if S' expresses a
true proposition.
If (C') is true, then the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in
(i) 'Giorgione' names a chess player
is purely referential. But surely we want to say that for any
variable a,
'a' names a chess player
is not an open sentence, since, a occurs here within quotation
marks. But if, for any variable a,
'a' names a chess player
is not an open sentence, and (E) is true, then, the occurrence
of 'Giorgione' in (i) is not purely referential. And, therefore,
if, for any variable a,
'a' names a chess player
is not an open sentence, then, (E) is true only if (C') is not
true.
30
Now, (E) identifies a concept which, I think, is of
great interest in discussions of referential opacity, and
if we were to reject (E), we ought to introduce a new term
to characterize that concept. I propose that, instead, we
accept (E) as explicative of the concept of a purely refer-
ential occurrence and that, therefore, (C') should be rejected.
(C), on the other hand, is an important principle, and, I
think that it will pay us to examine its consequences. As
for Quine's remarks about (i), the intuitions which underlie
it are captured by another distinction that Quine draws
attention to.
Quine writes:
In sentences there are positions where the term is used
as means simply of specifying its object, or purporting
to, for the rest of the sentence to say something about,
and there are positions where it is not. An example
of the latter sort is the position of 'Tully' in:
(a) 'Tully was a Roman' is trochaic.
When a singular term is used in a sentence purely to
specify its object, and the sentence is true of the
object, then certainly the sentence will stay true when
any other singular term is substituted that designates
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the same object. Here we have a criterion for
what may be called purely referential position:
the position must be subject to the substitutivity
of identity. That the position of 'Tully' in (a)
is not purely referential is reflected in the
falsity of what we get by supplanting 'Tully' in
(a) by 'Cicero'.20
This passage presents a two-fold distinction: one, a distinc-
tion among positions occupied by singular terms in a sentence,
and two, a distinction among uses of singular terms in a
sentence. Substitutability salva veritate of co-referential
singular terms is offered as a criterion for distinguishing
those positions of a singular term in a sentence which are
purely referential from those which are not; but what is
apparently given as a justification for this criterion is a
claim which involves diLtinguishing those uses of a singular
term in a sentence which are means simply (purely) of specify-
ing its object from those uses which are not. Quine has fre-
quently referred to the latter distinction as a distinction
between a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in
a sentence and other kinds of occurrence. To avoid confusion
between Quine's distinction among positions and the associated
2Word and Object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 142
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distinction among occurrences which is characterized in (E),
let us agree to use the phrase 'referentially transparent
position' in place of Quine's 'purely referential position'.
I shall understand by ra position of an occurrence of a
singular term a in S1 the result of deleting that occurrence
of a from S.21 Thus, the position of the occurrence of '9'
in '9 is odd' is '- is odd', the position of the first occur-
rence of 'x' in 'x=9-x is odd' is '-=9'x is odd', and the
position of the second occurrence of 'x' in 'x=9-x is odd' is
'x-9-- is odd'. It should be noted that each occurrence of a
singular term in a sentence has exactly one position in that
sentence; and that occurrences of two or more singular terms
in different sentences may have the same position in those
sentences, as, for instance, '- is odd' is the position of the
occurrence of '9' in '9 is odd', and also, the position of the
occurrence of 'The number of planets' in 'The number of planets
is odd'. Following Quine, I shall define referential trans-
parency of the position of an occurrence of a singular term
in a sentence thus:
(F) For any sentence S, any singular term a, and any
2The use of the word 'position' here, corresponds to
the way Quine, at times, uses 'context'.
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z, if z is the position of an occurrence, w, of
a in S, then z is referentially transparent if
and only if for any sentence S', and any singu-
lar term @, if S' is the result of substituting
@ for w (i.e. the relevant occurrence of a) in
S, and r a=P' expresses a true proposition then
S expresses a true proposition if and only if
S' expresses a true proposition. 2 2
And, following Quine, I shall say that the position of an
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is referentially
opaque if and only if it is not referentially transparent.
The position of the occurrence of '9' in '9 is odd', i.e.
'- is odd' is presumably referentially transparent, because,
for any singular term P, if ra=@n expresses a true proposition
then'~p is oddn expressses a true proposition if and only if
'9 is odd' expresses a true proposition. Similarly, the
position of the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in ''Giorgione' names
a chess player' is referentially transparent. However, (A) is
false if and only if the position of some occurrence of a
singular term in a sentence is referentially opaque. For (A)
2If S and 5' contain some free variables, read the
consequent as: 'the universal closure of rs . S''i expresses
a true proposition'.
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is false if and only if there are sentences S and S', and
expressions a and P, such that ra=p expresses a true proposi-
tion, S' is the result of substituting P for some occurrence
of a in S, and S expresses a true proposition but S' does not
express a true proposition. But then, given (F), the position
of some occurrence of a in S is not referentially transparent,
i.e. it is referentially opaque. Thus, since (1) and (2) ex-
press true propositions, but (3) does not express a true pro-
position, the position of the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in (2),
i.e. ''-' contains nine letters' is referentially opaque.
Similarly, the position of the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in (4,
i.e. '- was so-called because of his size' and the position of
the occurrence of '9' in (7), i.e. 'It is necessary that - is
odd' are both referentially opaque.
I shall say that a (one-place) sentential operator, I, is
referentially transparent if and only if any position z of an
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is referentailly
transparent only if rIz" is referentially transparent; and that
a sentential operator is referentially opaque if and only if it
is not referentially transparent. The sentential operators
'It is true that', and 'It is not the case that' are referen-
tially transparent; but 'It is necessary that' is referentially
opaque, since '- is odd' is referentially transparent, but 'It
is necessary that - is odd' is not. Similarly, since 'Hesperus
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= -' is referentially transparent but 'It is an astronomical
discovery that Hesperus = -' is not referentially transparent,
the sentential operator 'It is an astronomical discovery that'
is referentially opaque.
The concept of referential transparency of a position, as
one would expect, is closely connected with that of purely
referential occurrence. Suppose that the position of an
occurrence, w, of a singular term a in a sentence S, is not
referentially transparent. Given (F), there is, then, a
sentence S', and a singular term p such that S' is the result
of substituting p for w (i.e. the relevant occurrence of a in
S), ra=p' expresses a true proposition, and rS = g,, does not
express a true proposition. But then, given (D'), either w is
not purely referential, or the occurrence of P3in S' which
corresponds to w (in S) is not purely referential. Consider,
for instance, (7). Since the position of the occurrence of '9'
in (7) is not referentially transparent, given (F), and (D'),
it follows that there is some singular term a, such that r 9=a'
expresses a true proposition, and the occurrence of a in rIt is
necessary that a is odd1 is not purely referential. Given the
referential opacity of the position of the occurrence of '9' in
(7), and (F) and (D'), it also follows that for any singular
term a, such that '9=a' expresses a true proposition, if the
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proposition expressed by rIt is necessary that a is odd 1 differs
in truth-value from the proposition expressed by (7) then either
the occurrence of '9' in (7) is not purely referential or the
occurrence of a in rIt is necessary that a is odd' is not purely
referential. However, it is important to appreciate that it does
not follow from the referential opacity of the position of the
occurrence of '9' in (7), and (F) and (D') that the occurrence
of '9' in (7) is not purely referential.
Quine notes that the existence of referentially opaque
positions shows not only that (A) is false, but that existential
generalization is unwarranted, as well. Quine's remarks suggest
that existential generalization is the principle that
(G) for any sentences S, and S', any singular term a,
and any variable P, if P does not occur free in S,
and S' is the result of substituting P for one or
more occurrences of a in S, then, S expresses a
true proposition only if r(3 p)S'I expresses a
true proposition.23
23 From a Logical Point of View, second edition,
(Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 120, 145.
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As Quine notes, the existence of vacuous singular terms
falsifies (G); 'There is no such thing as Pegasus' expresses
a true proposition but '(3x) There is no such thing as x' does
not express a true proposition. (G) is also falsified by some
pairs of sentences whose members are (i) a sentence containing
an occurrence of a singular term which is not purely referential,
and (ii) an existential generalization of such an occurrence of
a singular term in that sentence. Consider, for instance, (4).
(4) expresses a true proposition, but if (G) is true, then
(4') (3x) x was so-called because of his size
expresses a true proposition as well. But surely we would say
that (4') does not express any proposition, and that, therefore,
it does not express a true proposition; and hence, (G) is false.
And consider (2). Since (2) expresses a true proposition, if
(G) is true, then
(2') (3x) 'x' contains nine letters
expresses a true proposition as well. Now it is not clear what
sense is to be made of (2'). Perhaps, one is to think of (2')
as expressing the proposition that 'x', the 24th letter of the
English alphabet contains nine letters. If so, (C) is false,
and the initial quantifier in (2') does not bind the second
occurrence of 'x' in (2'), since in its second occurrence 'x'
is not being used as a variable.
38
From considerations such as these, Quine appears to conclude
that 'if to a referentially opaque context of a variable we
apply a quantifier, with the intention that it govern that
variable from outside the referentially opaque context, then
what we commonly end up with is unintended sense or nonsense....
In a word, we cannot in general quantify into referentially
opaque contexts.',24 Making allowances for Quine's allusion to
unintended sense, I think that Quine's claim in this passage
may be formulated as:
(H) An occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be
bound by a quantifier outside of that sentence only
if the position of that occurrence (of the variable)
in the sentence is referentially transparent.
Since the position of the occurrence of 'x' in ''x' contains
nine letters', and the position of the occurrence of 'x' in
'x was so-called because of his size' are both referentially
opaque, if (H) is true, the second occurrence of 'x' in (2'),
and the second occurrence of 'x' in (4') both fail to be bound
by the initial quantifiers in (2') and (4') respectively.
(H) is to be distinguished from the claim that if an
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is not purely
2From A Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, 1963),
p. 148
39
referential then existential generalization on that occurrence
is unwarranted. The latter is suggested by the pairs of
sentences (2), and (2'), and (4), and (4'), and Quine, I think,
endorses it; but, it is the stronger (H), which I think,
articulates Quine's frequently repeated assertion that there
is no quantification into referentially opaaue contexts. It is
(H), then, that I shall describe as 'Quine's Thesis'.
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1.2 AMBIGUITY
Since
(6) 9 = the number of planets,
and
(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd,
express true propositions, and
(8) It is necessary that the number of planets is odd,
does not express a true proposition, the position of the
occurrence of '9' in (7) is refereitially opaque. And since
the position of the occurrence of 'x' in
(14) It is necessary that x is odd
is identical with the position of the occurrence of '9' in (7),
the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (14) is referentially
opaque. And if Quine's thesis is true,
(15) (3x) It is necessary that x is odd
is an instance of illicit quantification, where, as in the case
of
(4') (3x) x was so-called because of his size,
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the initial quantifier fails to bind the second occurrence of
'x' in that sentence. Barring some unintended interpretation,
(15) is then as unintelligible as (4'); - it expresses no
proposition.
The claim that (15) is as unintelligible as (4') strikes
one as puzzling. It seems that there is such a thing as the
proposition that something is such that it is necessarily odd,
and that (15) is as good a candidate to express it as any. The
point is not that the proposition that something is such that
it is necessarily odd is true, though one is inclined to think
that it is, but rather that it seems that there is such a
proposition and that there appears to be no reason to think
that (15) does not express it.
Now, if the idea of necessity was an idea of something
which was an attribute or a characteristic only of closed
sentences, and we looked upon, for instance, (7) as a deficient
way of expressing what is expressed by
'9 is odd' is necessary
there would be no temptation to think that there is such a
thing as the proposition that something is such that it is
necessarily odd; and, presumably, we would not be puzzled by
the suggestion that (15) is unintelligible, for (15) could
then, at best, be viewed as a careless rendering of
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(15') (3x) 'x is odd' is necessary.
Though the position of the occurrence of 'x' in
'x is odd' is necessary
is referentially opaque, it would seem that (15') does not pro-
vide any reason against Quine's thesis; for one is inclined to
think that since the second occurrence of 'x' in (15') is
within quotation marks, it is not bound by the initial quantifier
in that sentence.
Again, if the idea of necessity was an idea of something
which was an attribute or a characteristic only of those things
that closed sentences express and which are affirmed or denied,
i.e. propositions, and we looked upon, for instance, (7) as
expressing what is expressed by
The proposition that 9 is odd is necessary,
there would be no temptation to think that there is such a thing
as the proposition that something is such that it is necessarily
odd; and, presumably, we would not-be puzzled by the suggestion
that (15) is unintelligible, for (15) could then, at best, be
viewed as a careless rendering of
(15'') (3x) The proposition that x is odd is necessary,
'and it is not clear whether sense can be made of (15'').
43
However, it is I think false, though I have no proof that
it is false, that the idea of necessity is an idea of something
which is an attribute or a characteristic only of closed sentences
or propositions. It appears to make sense to say such things as
Ci) 9 is odd and 9 could not have failed to be odd,
and
(ii) The number of planets is odd and the number of
planets, whatever it is, could not have failed
to be odd.
In saying (i) and (ii) I intend to say, not of any sentence or a
proposition that it is true and that it could not have failed to
be true; but rather of a certain number that it is such and such,
and that it could not have failed to be such and such. And it
seems to me that if it makes sense to say such things as (i)
and (ii) (regardless of whether they are true or not) then
it also makes sense to say such things as
(iii) Something is odd and it could not have failed to be
odd,
and
(iv) Something is such that it is necessarily odd.
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But if it does make sense to say such things as (iii) and (iv)
then it would seem that the claim that (15) is unintelligible
is false, for (15) appears to express the same proposition as
(iv).
Verbs of propositional attitudes and temporal modifiers
give rise to similar problems. Quine draws attention to what
he describes as 'the relational and notional senses of believing
in spies' in these words:
(16) (3x) Ralph believes that x is a spy
and
(16') Ralph believes that (3x) x is a spy
both may perhaps be ambiguously phrased as 'Ralph believes
that someone is a spy', but they may be unambiguously
phrased respectively as 'There is someone whom Ralph
believes to be a spy' and Ralph believes that there are
spies'. The difference is vast; if Ralph is like most of
us (16') is true and (16) false.25
But, now it will surely be granted that if Ralph is like most of
us, the position of the occurrence of 'x' in
2'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' reprinted in
Reference and Modality, ed. Leonard Linsky (Oxford, 1971) p. 102.
I have changed the numbering to conform to that of the present essay.
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Ralph believes that x is a spy
is referentially opaque; that is, there are expressions a and @
such that ra=P' and rRalph believes that a is a spy' express
true propositions, and Ralph believes that @ is a spy" does not
express a true proposition. But then, if Quine's thesis is true,
the second occurrence of 'x' in (16) is not bound by the initial
quantifier in that sentence; and therefore, barring some
unintended interpretation, (16) is unintelligible. And if (16)
is unintelligible, it would seem that
(v) There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy
is unintelligible as well, for (16) appears to express the
same proposition as (v). And again, if Quine's thesis is
true, barring some unintended interpretation,
(17) (3x) Sometime in the past x was a Catholic
must be counted as unintelligible, since the position of the
occurrence of 'x' in
Sometime in the past x was a Catholic
is referentially opaque; for surely
Reagan = the president of the U.S.
and
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Sometime in the past the president of the U.S. was
a Catholic
express true propositions, but
Sometime in the past Reagan was a Catholic
does not express a true proposition. But if (17) is unintelli-
gible, then it seems that
(vi) There is someone who sometime in the past was a
Catholic
must be unintelligible as well, for (16) appears to express the
same proposition as (vi). And yet it seems that there is no
difficulty in understanding either (17) or (vi), and indeed no
special difficulty in identifying an individual who sometime in
the past was a Catholic.
How is one to resolve these difficulties? In 'Quantifiers
and Propositional Attitudes', where Quine raises the second of
these difficulties, he suggests:
As we are scarcely prepared to sacrifice the relational
construction 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be
a spy' which (16) as opposed to (16') was supposed to
reproduce, the obvious next move is to try to make the
best of our dilemma by distinguishing two senses of belief:
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belief1 , which disallows conjunctions of the form
(18) w sincerely denies '---'. w believes that ---
and belief 2 , which tolerates (18) but makes sense of (16).
For belief 1 , accordingly, we sustain
(19) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
and
(20) Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the
beach is a spy
(even though the man in the brown hat is the man seen at
the beach) and ban (16) as nonsense. For belief2, on the
other hand we sustain (16); and for this sense of belief we
must reject (20) and acquiesce in the conclusion that Ralph
believes2 that the man at the beach is a spy even though he
also believes2 (and believes ) that the man at the beach is
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not a spy.
It might seem that here we have a general strategy for deal-
ing with any apparent counterexample to Quine's thesis. For in-
stance, someone might suggest:
2'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' reprinted in
Reference and Modatity, ed. Leonard Linaky (Oxford, 1971) p. 103-
104. I have changed the numbering to conform to that of the pre-
sent essay.
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As we are scarcely prepared to sacrifice the de re
construction 'Something is such that it is necessarily
odd' which (15) was supposed to reproduce, the obvious
next move is to try to make the best of our dilemma by
distinguishing two senses of necessity: necessity1 , which
disallows conjunctions of the form
(18') '---' is not analytic. it is necessary that ---
and necessity 2 , which tolerates (18') but makes sense of
(15). For necessity1 , accordingly we sustain
(19') It is necessary that 9 is odd
and
(20') It is not necessary that the number of planets
is odd
(even though 9 is the number of planets) and ban (15) as
nonsense. For necessity2, on the other hand, we sustain
(15); and for this sense of necessity we must reject (20')
and acquiesce in the conclusion that it is necessary2 that
the number of planets is odd even though it is not necessary1
?hat th? number of planets is odd.
These suggestions are incomprehensible. We do not know
what 'belief1 ' and 'ble2', and similarly what 'necessity1 '
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and 'necessity2 ', mean. That these expressions resemble some
expressions of English cannot be regarded as more than merely
a coincidence. We are told that for belief1 we ban (16) as
nonsense, but for belief2 we sustain (16). Presumably, that
is to say that
(i) (3x) Ralph believes1 that x is a spy
is to count as unintelligible, but
(ii) (3x) Ralph believesl that x is a spy
will count as intelligible. If so, that would, indeed,
distinguish belief1 and belief2 ; but there is no reason to
suppose that it distinguishes two senses of belief. Similarly,
to suppose that
(3x) It is necessary2 that x is odd
is intelligible is irrelevant to whether or not (15) is
intelligible; we would first need to know what concept, if any,
is the concept of necessity2. The contrast between belief and
belief1 is presumably meant to reflect some contrast between what
Quine calls 'the transparent sense of belief' and 'the opaque
sense of belief'. 2 7 But even if these senses, whatever they are,
2Word and Object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 145
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are adequately characterized, I shall argue that there is
strong evidence to suggest that if the expressions 'It is
necessary2 that' and 'Ralph believes2 that' are referentially
transparent then they do not express any sense of 'It is nec-
essary that', or 'Ralph believes that' respectively.
Let us say that sentences S, and S' are weakly equivalent
if and only if r. S" is true in every interpretation in which
the class abstraction operator 'A' and the sign of class member-
ship receive their intended interpretations. Sentences which
are (logically) equivalent are, obviously, weakly equivalent;
but the converse is not true. For instance
(i)(x=x) = (R)(xox)
and
(Vx)(x=x)
are weakly equivalent but not logically equivalent. And let us
say that a sentential operator I is normal if and only if, for
any sentences S and S', if S and S' are weakly equivalent, then
IS . IS'I is true. Following an argument of Quine, 2 8 it can be
shown that if a normal sentential operator of a language, which
has 'A' and 'E' in its vocabulary, is referentially transparent
2From A Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, 1963), p. 159
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then it is truth-functional.
Suppose that I is a normal and a referentially transparent
sentential operator of a language in which 'A' is available.
Given any sentence S, since S is weakly equivalent to
(i)(x=x-S) = ()(x=x)
rIS*I(X^)(x=x-S)= (i)(x=x) 1
is true. But given any sentence S' which has the same truth-
value as S,
r(k)(x.xeS) = (^)(x~x~gr
is true. But then, since I is referentially transparent,
rIS I()(=X-S') = ()(x=x)'
is true. Now S' is weakly equivalent to
()(x=x-S') = (^)(x=x)
and since I is normal,
rIS IS'
is true; and hence, I is truth-functional.
The proposed sentential operator 'It is necessary2 that' is
by hypothesis, referentially transparent. But then, if a
language in which it is introduced has 'A' and 'E' in its
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vocabulary, 'It is necessary2 that' is either truth-functional,
or it is not normal - that is, substitution of some weakly
equivalent sentence for S in rIt is necessary2 that S' does not
preserve truth-value. Now, it would seem that any sentential
operator whose sense is a sense of 'It is necessary that' must
be normal and it must not be truth-functional. But if this
is right, and 'It is necessary2 that' is referentially trans-
parent, then, whatever its sense, it is not a sense of 'It is
necessary that'.
The preceding result that any normal and referentially
transparent sentential operator of a language, which includes
'A' and 'E' in its vocabulary, is truth-functional, also
supports the claim that there is no sentential operator in this
language which is referentailly transparent and whose sense is
a sense of 'sometime in the past'; for presumably, any sentential
operator whose sense is a sense of 'sometime in the past' is
normal and non-truth-functional. On the other hand, 'Ralph
believes that' is not a normal sentential operator, - for
whatever the logical acumen of Ralph, we do not expect that
for any weakly equivalent senteces S and S', if rRalph believes
that S' expresses a true proposition then r Ralph believes that
''expresses a true proposition as well. Hence it would not
be reasonable to suppose that 'Ralph believes2 that' is a
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normal operator, if the sense of 'believes2' is a sense of
'believes'. However, as Quine remarks, the stipulation
that 'Ralph believes2 that' is a referentially transparent
sentential operator whose sense is a sense of 'Ralph believes
that' leads to unwelcome results, even though it is not a
normal operator. Let us say that ra believes2 that" is a
quasi-normal operator if and only if the referent of a sat-
isfies every instance of the following schema:
(i) x believes2 that S if and only if x believes2
that the truth-value of the proposition that S
is the true.
It appears reasonable to suppose that if the sense of 'believes2
is a sense of 'believes', then it is possible that there is some
individual who satisfies every instance of (i). Suppose that
Ralph does. But since 'Ralph believes2 that' is, by hypothesis,
referentially transparent, given any sentences S and S', if
rthe truth-value of the proposition that S =
the truth-value of the proposition that S'
expresses a true proposition,
rRalph believes2 that the truth-value of the pro-
position that S is the true +-+ Ralph believes2 that
the truth-value of the proposition that 5' is the true1
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expresses a true proposition. And since 'Ralph believes that'
is supposed to be quasi-normal,
rRalph believes2 that S ++ Ralph believes2 that S''
expresses a true proposition. Hence if the sense of 'believes2
is a sense of 'believes' and 'Ralph believes2 that' is refer-
entially transparent and quasi-normal, then Ralph believes
every proposition if he believes at least one true proposition
and one false proposition.
A proponent of the view that 'It is necessary2 that' is a
referentially transparent sentential operator whose sense is
a sense of 'It is necessary that' is likely to reject the
assumption that any sentential operator whose sense is a sense
of 'It is necessary that' is normal. Similarly, a proponent of
the view that 'Ralph believes2 that' is a referentially trans-
parent sentential operator whose sense is a sense of 'Ralph
believes that' is likely to reject the assumption that 'Ralph
believes2 that' is quasi-normal. Suppose that there is a unique
sense of 'It is necessary that' which is customarily thought to
be the sense of 'It is necessary that'. One might propose that
we understand 'It is necessary1 that' as unambiguously expressing
the sense which is customarily thought to be the sense of 'It is
necessary that', and define a new sentential operator 'It is
necessary2 that' as follows:
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(ii) For any sentences S and S', and any singular
terms a,......a,.if the set of singular terms
which occurs in S is {aI,
. . . . .
,an} or empty,
and S' is the result of replacing all occurrences
of a,
.... .
, an in S respectively with the var-
iables.x.....x which do not occur in S, then
rIt is necessary2 that S' expresses a true pro-
position if and only if < the referent of a1 ,
., the referent of a > satisfies It is
necessary1 that S'".
If 'It is necessary2 that' is to be understood as defined in
(ii), then clearly 'It is necessary2  that' is a referentially
transparent operator but it is also non-normal. For, given (ii),
It is necessary2 that the number of planets is odd
expresses a true proposition, since, presumably 9, the number of
planets, satisfies
It is necessary1 that x is odd.
On the other hand, given (ii),
It is necessary2 that there is a unique number of
planets and it is odd
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does not express a true proposition, since, presumably
It is necessary1 that there is a unique number of
planets and it is odd
is not satisfied by any sequence, But,
The number of planets is odd
is weakly equivalent to
There is a unique number of planets and it is odd,
and, therefore, 'It is necessary2 that' is not a normal sentential
operator.
Similarly, suppose that there is a unique sense of 'Ralph
believes that' which is customarily thought to be the sense of
'Ralph believes that'. It might be proposed that we understand
'Ralph believes that' as unambiguously expressing the sense which
is customarily thought to be the sense of 'Ralph believes that',
and define a new sentential operator 'Ralph believes2 that' as
follows:
(iii) For any sentences S and S', and any singular terms
a1 ,. .. .. , a , if the set of singular terms which1 n
occur in S is {a',
. . . . .
,
.
n or empty, and S' is
the result of replacing all occurrences of a1 ,.. . . ,
an in S respectively with the variables x1 ,.. .. . , xn
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which do not occur in S, then r Ralph believes2 that
S1 expresses a true proposition if and only if <
the referent of a1 ,. ... .., the referent of an> sat-
isfies rRalph believes1 that S'.
If 'Ralph believes2 that' is to be understood as defined in (iii)
then, clearly, 'Ralph believes2 that' is a referentially trans-
parent sentential operator, but given (iii), it would also be
unreasonable to suppose that 'Ralph believes2 that' is quasi-
normal. For if Ralph is like any of us, it would be very un-
reasonable to insist that if there are truth-values, a, and the
true, such that <a, the true> satisfies
Ralph believes1 that x is y
then, provided that a is the truth-value of the proposition that
the man in the brown hat is a spy, the man in the brown hat satisfies
Ralph believesI that x is a spy.
But if < the truth-value of the proposition that the man in the
brown hat is a spy, the true > satisfies
Ralph believes1 that x is y,
and the man in the brown hat does not satisfy
Ralph believes that x is a spy,A% 1
58
the, given (iii),
Ralph believes2 that the truth-value of the
proposition that the man in the brown hat is
a spy is the true
expresses a true proposition, though,
Ralph believes2 that the man in the brown hat
is a spy
does not express a true proposition. But, then, 'Ralph believeg2
that' is not a quasi-normal operator.
Now, anyone, who like Quine, thinks that since the positions
of the occurrences of 'x' in
It is nece iary that x is odd,
and
Ralph believes that x is a spy
are referentially opaque, these are not the kind of sentences of
which one could intelligibly speak as being satisfied by any ob-
ject, would be inclined to reject (ii) and (iii) as incoherent.
Thus, if the purpose of introducing definitions (ii) and (iii)
was to find a way of articulating thoughts such as those intended
to be expressed by-
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(15) (3x) It is necessary that x is odd,
and
(16) (3x) Ralph believes that x is a spy,
without violating Quine's thesis, then (ii) and (iii) do not
achieve this purpose. But even if these Quinean considerations
against (ii) and (iii) are to be disregarded, it seems to me
unlikely that the sense of 'It is necessary2 that' as defined
in (ii) is a sense of 'It is necessary that', or that the
sense of 'Ralph believes2 that' as defIned in (iii) is a sense
of 'Ralph believes that'.
Presumably, the ideas which underlie (ii) and (iii) are that
(a) there is a sense of 'It is necessary that' such that,
given that sense, any occurrence of a singular term
in the scope of 'It is necessary that' is purely
referential,
and
(b) there is a sense of 'Ralph believes that', such that,
given that sense, every occurrence of a singular term
in the scope of 'Ralph believes that' is purely
referential.
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Now, if, for instance, (a) is true, then there is a sense of
'It is necessary that' such that construed in that sense, 'it
is necessary that' is both referentially transparent and non-
normal. But if there are any reasons to suppose that (a) is
true, then there are equally good reasons to suppose that
there is a sense of 'It is necessary that', such that, given
that sense, only the first occurrence of a singular term in
the scope of 'It is necessary that' is purely referential. And
again, if there are reasons to suppose that (a) is true, then
there are equally good reasons to suppose that there is a
sense of 'It is necessary that', such that, given that sense,
only the second occurrence of a singular term in the scope of
'It is necessary that' is purely referential; and so on. Now,
though, it is reasonable to suppose that, for instance,
(8) It is necessary that the number of planets is odd
is ambiguous, it is, I think a mistake to locate the source of
this ambiguity in a multiplicity of senses of 'It is necessary
that'. Similarly, though it is reasonable to suppose that
(19) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is
a spy
is ambiguous, it is, I think, a mistake to locate the source of
this ambiguity in a multiplicity of senses of 'Ralph believes
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that'. But if, as I have suggested, (ii) and (iii) do not suc-
ceed in identifying senses of 'It is necessary that' and 'Ralph
believes that' respectively, I see no reason to suppose either
that there is a non-normal and a referentially transparent
sentential operator whose sense is a sense of 'It is necessary
that', or that no sentential operator whose sense is a sense
of ra believes that' can be quasi-normal.
The problem that I have been examining in this section is
this: If Quine's thesis is true, then in each of
(15) (3x) It is necessary that x is odd,
(16) (3x) Ralph believes that x is a spy,
and
(17) (3x) Sometime in the past x was a Catholic.
the initial quantifier fails to bind the second occurrence of
'x', and therefore, barring some unintended interpretations,
none of these sentences express any proposition. In Quine's
words, these are to be counted as nonsense. But not only do
these sentences appear intelligible, it would also seem that
if these sentences were unintelligible, then the corresponding
English sentences
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(iv) Something is such that it is necessarily odd,
(v) There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy,
and
(vi) There is someone who sometime in the past was a
Catholic
would be unintelligible as well, for the latter are apparently
synonymous with (15), (16), and (17) respectively. The alleged
failure of (15), (16), and (17) to express the thoughts that
one intends to express by them would indeed be taken as evidence
that these thoughts themselves are incoherent. Are we then to
reject Quine's thesis, or to acquiesce in the conclusion that
(15), (16), and (17) are unintelligible?
We have seen that if the expressions 'necessary', 'believes',
and 'sometime in the past' were ambiguous in such a way as to
allow interpretations of 'It is necessary that', 'Ralph believes
that', and 'Sometime in the past' which would render them refer-
entially transparent, this dilemma would be resolved. Following
Quine I have argued that the project of locating such an ambiguity
in these expressions must fail since any sentential operator of
a suitably rich language which is referentially transparent and
normal cannot express necessity or temporality, and cannot ex-
press belief if it is quasi-normal.
63
In discussions of Quine's views on quantified modal logic,
attention is sometimes drawn to what is apparently a purely syn-
tactic ambiguity in some modal sentences. For instance,
(8) It is necessary that the number of planets is odd,
may be understood, de re, as formulating the proposition that the
number of planets, whatever it is, is necessarily odd; but it may
also be understood, de dicto, as formulating the proposition that
the number of planets is odd is necessary. Though the ambiguity
of sentences such as (8) has frequenly been noticed, it has not
been always adequately characterized. Plantinga, for instance,
describes a de re ascription of necessity as an ascription to an
object of having a property necessarily, and a de dicto ascrip-
tion of necessity as an ascription to a proposition of having the
property of being necessarily true.30 A de dicto ascription of
necessity is then seen as an instance of a de re ascription of
necessity. Thus, on Plantinga's view, (8) may be understood as
formulating the proposition that the number of planets has the pro-
perty of being necessarily odd, but it may also be understood as
formulating the proposition that that the number of planets is odd
has the property of being necessarily true. This claim, I think
is false. (8) does not admit of a reading under which it says or
3The Nature of Necessity, (Oxford University Press, 1974),
pp. 9-13.
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entails that the number of planets (whatever it is) has the
property of being necessarily odd. Not that I think that there
is no such property, nor that the number of planets lacks it;
but rather that (8) does not admit of a reading under which it
says or entails that there is such a property or that the
number of planets has it. What I see as a difficulty in
Plantinga's exposition of the availability of de re/de dicto
readings of a sentence such as (8) arises from a more general
consideration concerning Russell's Paradox. It is a lesson to
be learned from what is essentially Russell's Paradox that not
every open sentence determines a property. We need then an
additional argument other than simply an observation of some
structural ambiguity in (8) to support the claim that (8) admits
of a reading under which it says ot 9 that it has the property
of being necessarily odd.
Smullyan characterizes the ambiguity of sentences such as
(8) using Russell's notions of scope and contextual definition
of definite descriptions.31 (8), on his view, may be understood
as expressing the proposition expressed by
(3x)((Vy)(y numbers the planets * y=x) -it is
necessary that x is odd)
3'Modality & Description', The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
1948, pp. 31-7
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or, it may be understood as expressing the proposition expressed
by
It is necessary that (3x)(Vy)(y numbers the planets
a y=x) - x is odd)
Now, I think that the question of whether definite descriptions are
contextually defineable is quite independent of any considerations
of scope; and if we were presently to ignore Quine's thesis, the
ambiguity of (8) may be depicted by resorting to quantification.
(8) may be seen as formulating the proposition formulated in
either
(21) (Vx)(x = the number of planets -+ it is necessary
that x is odd)
or
(21') It is necessary that (Vx) (x = the number of
planets -+ x is odd).
Since the ambiguity in (8) is a structural ambiguity, there is
no reason to think that a similar ambiguity is not present in
(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd
as well. Like (8), (7) admits of a reading under which it ex-
presses what is presumably expressed by
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(22) (Vx)(x=9 -+ it is necessary that x is odd),
but it also admits of a reading under which it expresses what
is expressed by
(22') It is necessary that (Vx) (x=9 -+ x is odd).
That both (22) and (22') express true propositions is irrelevant
to the issue of structural ambiguity. 3 2
The claim that the ambiguity in (7) and (8) arises out of
disctinctions of scope of the various expressions in these sentences
suggests that similar ambiguity may be found in
(19) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is
a spy,
and
(23) Sometime in the past it was the case that the president
of the U.S. was a Catholic.
(19) admits of a reading under which it expresses what is pre-
sumably expressed by
32 The misconception that de dicto/de re ambiguity requires
difference of truth-value may be found in Linsky's remark:
"Kripke cannot admit that these names 'St. Anne', 'Homer', or
any others, do induce de dicto/de re ambiguity... . His principal
thesis about proper names - that they are rigid designators, just
is logically equivalent, in his Semantic for Quantified Modal
Logic, to the thesis that they cannot induce de dicto/de re
ambiguity." Names and Descriptions, pp. 56-7.
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(24) (Vx)(x = the man in the brown hat -+ Ralph believes
that x is a spy),
but it also admits of perhaps the more natural reading under
which it expresses what is expressed by
(24') Ralph believes that (Vx)(x = the man at the beach
-+ x is a spy.
Similarly, the ambiguity in (23) is characterized by
(25) (Vx)(x = the president of the U.S. -+ sometime in the
past it was the case that x was a Catholic)
and
(25') Sometime in the past it was the case that (Vx)
(x = the president of the U.S. -+ x was a Catholic)
Now, though I think that it ought to be acknowledged that
sentences (7), (8), (19), and (23) are structurally ambiguous,
it is not easy to see what, if any, relevance the appeal to the
ambiguity in these sentences has to the problem at hand.
Rather than guiding us how to formulate a thought such as that
the number of planets is necessarily odd without apparently
violating Quine's thesis, our characterization of the ambiguity
in these sentences suggests that Quine's thesis is false. Each
of the sentences (21), (22), (24), and (25) contains an
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occurrence of a variable in the scope of a referentially
opaque operator which is intended to be bound by a quantifier
outside; but these are the very kinds of sentences ihich are
proclaimed unintelligible in the light of Quine's thesis.
Perhaps the proposal, after all, is not simply that we pay
attention to the structural ambiguity in sentences such as (8),
(19), and (23), but that the definite descriptions in these (and
other) sentences are to be contextually defined as well. Thus
Smullyan writes:
'In the light of our discussion so far, it may suggest
itself to the reader that the modal paradoxes arise not out
of any intrinsic absurdity in the use of the modal operators
but rather out of the assumption that descriptive phrases
are names. It may indeed be the case that the critics of
modal logic object primarily not to the use of modal
operators but to the method of contextual definition as
employed, e.g. in Russell's theory of definite descriptions.'33
Now it is true that in a language which does not contain any
definite descriptions the sentential operator 'It is necessary
that' will be referentially transparent, and hence Quine's thesis
will not rule against quantified modal sentences of such a
'Modality & Description', The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
1948.
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language; but it should be noticed that Quine's thesis is not
directed against quantified modal sentences alone. If Quine's
thesis is true then a variable in the scope of any referentially
opaque operator cannot be bound by a quantifier outside. But
now it seems that the referential opacity of epistemic operators
such as 'Ralph believes that' does not depend upon the presence
of a definite description in a sentence. It seems reasonable
to suppose that, for instance, 'Ralph believes that Hesperus is
a planet' does not express a true proposition even though 'Ralph
believes that Venus is a planet' may express a true proposition.
And hence the eliminability of definite descriptions does not
ensure that, for instance, '(3x) Ralph believes that x is a
planet' is intelligible.
No doubt it will be suggested that names are not genuine
singular terms either, and that following Quine's proposal
names are to be contextually defined as well.34 It seems to me
that Quine's proposal about conte-:tual definability of names
faces serious objections. It is not my intent to pursue these
objections here, but it should be noted that even if all singular
terms other than variables are contextually defined, the
difficulty which is raised by Quine's thesis is not fully
resolved. I formulated Quine' s thesis as a thesis about first-
From A Logical Point of' View, (Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 7,8
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order variables, but if Quine's thesis is true there is no
reason to think that the following corresponding thesis about
second-order variables is not true:
An occurrence of a second-order variable in a
sentence is bound by a quantifier outside of
that sentence only if the position of the occurrence
of the variable in that sentence is extensional.
But if this thesis is true, then in
(3X) It is necessary that 9 is X
the second occurrence of 'X' is not bound by the initial
quantifier since its position in
It is necessary that 9 is X
is clearly not extensional. Evidently no strategy for context-
ually defining those predicates which are responsible for the
non-extensionality of 'It is necessary that' is available. It
seems to me then that a resolution of the general problem
raised by Quine's thesis is not to be found in the contextual
definability of those singular terms which are responsible for
the referential opacity of operators such as 'It is necessary
that', and 'Ralph believes that'.
Let us then re-examine the notion of ambiguity. I
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described the ambiguity in (8) as a structural ambiguicy and
depicted it by adverting to the idiom of quantification. The
contrast between the two readings of (8) is thus seen as a
contrast between the role of the modal operator 'It is necessary
that' as a modifier of closed sentences as in (21') and its role
as a modifier of open sentences as in (21). But if, as I have
suggested, for any name or a definite description a, rIt is
necessary that a is odd', or equivalently Necessarily a is
odd1 is structurally ambiguous, then there is no reason not to
suppose that rNecessarily a is odd' admits of a similar structural
ambiguity where a is a variable. It would seem that in
'Necessarily x is odd', 'Necessarily' may be construed as
modifying the open sentence 'x is odd', or it may be construed
as modifying the verb phrase 'is odd', or simply the expression
'odd'. This ambiguity in 'Necessarily x is odd' obviously
cannot be illustrated by the use of quantification, but one
may use some arbitrary convention such as the one employed in
(26) and (26') below to disambiguate the sentence. Thus in
(26) Necessarily (x is odd)
one is to understand 'Necessarily' as unambiguously modifying
the open sentence 'x is odd', whereas in
k26') x is necessarily-odd
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it is taken as modifying the expression 'odd'. Now it should
be noticed that the occurrence of 'x' in (26'), unlike its
occurrence in (26) is not in the scope of a referentially
opaque operator, and that its position in (26'), unlike its
position in (26) is referentially transparent. Thus,
(27') (3x) x is necessarily-odd
unlike (15) and
(27) (3x) Necessarily (x is odd)
does not purport to violate Quine's thesis.
Quine notices an analogous structural distinction in
epistemic sentences. 35 He contrasts
(28) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline
with
(28') By Tom Cicero is believed to have denounced Catiline
and points out that whereas the position of the occurrence of
'Cicero' in (28) is referentially opaque, its position in (28')
is referentially transparent. Thus, if Quine's thesis is true,
Word and Object, (The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 149-151
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(29) (Bx) Tom believes that x denounced Catiline
fails to express a proposition, but
(29') (3x) By Tom x is believed to have denounced Catiline
is unobjectionable.
Now, though I think that the structural ambiguity in
'Necessarily x is odd' (and analogous belief sentences etc.)
ought to be recognized and consequently the structural difference
between (27) and (27') (and analogously between (29) and (29'))
ought to be acknowledged, it would not be a satisfactory response
to the issue raised by Quine's thesis that (27') (or (29')) does
not violate Quine's thesis and that it succeeds in expressing
what was intended to be expressed by (27) (or (29)). For
surely if the variables in (27) and (27') (and (29) and (29'))
are variables of objectual quantification, it would seem that
(27) (or (29)) expresses a proposition if and only if (27') (or
(29')) does. An advocate of Quine's thesis who claimo that (27)
is unintelligible, but (27') is not, owes us an explanation.
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1.3 QUINE'S THESIS
Is Quine's thesis true?
In a recent article Kaplan writes:
I have concluded that in 1943 Quine made a mistake.
He believed himself to have given a proof of a general
theorem36 regarding the semantical interpretation of
any language that combines quantification with opacity.
The purported theorem says that in a sentence, if a
given position occupied by a singular term, is not
open to substitution by co-designative singular terms
salva veritate, then that position cannot be occupied
by a variable bound to an initially placed quantifier.
The proof offered assumes that quantification receives
its standard interpretation. But the attempted proof
is fallacious. And what is more, the theorem is false.
Kaplan then goes on to reconstruct the alleged proof as follows:
Step 1: A purely designative occurrence of a
singular term a in a formula p is one in which a
is used solely to designate the object. [This
3Kaplan calls 'Quine's Theorem' the claim that I have
described as Quine's Thesis. Kaplan uses 'Quine's Thesis! for
a different claim, presumably also endorsed by Quine.
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is a definition.}
Step 2: If a has a purely designative occurrence in
4, the the truth-value of 4 depends only on what
a designates, not on how a designates. [From 1]
Step 3: Variables are devices of pure reference;
they cannot have non-purely designative occurrences.
[By standard semantics]
Step 4: If a and P designate the same thing, but
Oa and O@ differ in truth-value, then the occur-
rences of a in *a and P in 4p are not purely
designative. [From 2]
Now assume (5.1): a and B are co-designative
singular terms, and 4a and OP differ in truth-
value, and (5.2): y is a variable whose value is
the object designated by a and P.
Step 6: Either *a and 4y differ in truth-value or
4P and $y differ in truth-value. [From 5.1 since
Oa and OP differ.]
Step 7: The occurrence of y in *y is not purely
designative. [From 5.2, 6, and 4]
Step 8: cy is semantically incoherent. [From 7
and 3]
Kaplan notes:
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All but one of these steps seem to me to be innocuous.
That one is step 4 which, of course, does not follow
from 2. All that follows from 2 is that at least one
of the two occurrences is not purely designative.
When 4 is corrected in this way, 7 no longer follows.
The error of 4 appears in later writings in a slightly
different form. It is represented by an unjustified
shift from talk about occurrences to talk about posi-
tions. Failure of substitution does show that some
occurrence is not purely referential. (Shifting now
from the 'designative' language of 'Notes on Existence
and Necessity' to the 'referential' language of
'Reference and Modality'). From this it is concluded
that the context (read 'position') is referentially
opaque. And thus that what the context expresses 'is
in general not a trait of the object concerned, but
depends on the manner of referring to the object.'
Hence, we cannot properly quantify into a referentially
37
opaque context.
Though Kaplan claims that the only step in his reconstruction of
Quine's alleged proof to which he takes exception is Step 4,
All quotations froni Kaplan are from his 'A Historical
Note On Quine's Argument Concerning Substitution and Quantification'
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there are a number of difficulties presented by other steps in
this argument which deserve attention. If, as Kaplan indicates,
the proposition expressed in Step 1 is a definition of 'a purely
referential occurrence of a singular term',38 then it seems to
me that there simply are no purely referential occurrences of
a singular term, since no singular term is used (in a sentence)
solely to refer. There are obviously numerous other uses that
an occurrence of a singular term has in a sentence. Hence, if
the proposition expressed in Step 1 is a definition then the
proposition expressed in Step 3 is not a truth of standard
semantics, it is simply false.
Apparently, the proposition expressed in Step 2 is false
as well. Consider, for instance,
Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.
Notwithstanding Step 1, it would, I think, be granted that
'Giorgione' has a purely referential occurrence in this sentence.
However, it is not true that the truth-value of this sentence
depends only on what 'Giorgione' designates; for if it did
Giorgione was called 'Barbarelli' because of his size,
3Following 'Reference & Modality', I have used the word
'referential'.
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would be true as well. Perhaps what is intended as Step 2 is
this:
If a has only a purely referential occurrence in 4,
then the truth-value of 0 depends only on what a
refers to, not on how a refers.
But this will not do either, since, obviously, the truth-value
of a sentence depends also on what other terms in that sentence
mean or refer to.
Now if we understand the notation '4a' in Step 4 as
standing for any sentence S which contains one or more
occurrences of a, and 'Op' as the result of replacing an
occurrence of a in S by P, then the proposition expressed in
Step 4 is equivalent to (D) of Sec. 1.1. (D) is the principle
that
for any sentences S and S', any singular terms a and
@, and any z, if z is an occurrence of a in S and S'
is the result of substituting P for z in S, then if
ra[=Plexpresses a true proposition and rS S'l does
not express a true proposition, then z and the
corresponding occurrence of P in S' are both not
purely referential.
As Kaplan emphasizes, if the proposition expressed in Step 4,
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or equivalently (D), is true, then there is a strong argument
for Quine's thesis. Suppose that a sentence S1 contains an
occurrence of a singular term a. Let us agree to represent S
as follows:
S:1
Suppose, moreover, that the position of the displayed occurrence
of a in S1 is not referentially transparent. Then there is a
sentence S2 and a singular term a such that S2 is the result of
replacing the displayed occurrence of a in S1 with a, Fa=s'
expresses a true proposition and rS S2' does not express a
true proposition.
S2 --
Consider now a sentence S3 and a variable y (which does not occur
in S1) such that S3 is the result of replacing the displayed
occurrence of a in S1 with y and the value of y in S3 is the
object designated by a and S. Since the position of the
occurrence of y in S3 is identical with the position of the
displayed occurrence of a in S and since the position of the
displayed occurrence of a in S is not referentially transparent,
the position of the occurrence of y in S3 is not referentially
transparent. But now, since 'S *S21 does not express a true
proposition, either F~S c.S3~' does not express a true proposition
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or rs2 eS3' does not express a true proposition. But since
ry=ap and ry=S' both express true propositions, if (D) is true,
the occurrence of y in S3 is not purely referential. But if
(J) the occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be
bound by a quantifier outside that sentence only if
that occurrence is purely referential,
is true, then the occurrence of y in S3 may not be bound by
a Quantifier outside of S3. Hence if (D) and (J) are true and
the position of the occurrence of a variable in a sentence is
not referentially transparent, then the occurrence of that
variable in the sentence may not be bound by a quantifier
outside the sentence.
Are (D) and (J) true? To answer this question we need to
know what it is for an occurrence of a singular term in a
sentence to be purely referential. Now Quine remarks:
'Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence
to be supplanted is not purely referential.'39  I formulated
this claim in sec. 1.1 as
(C) For any sentence S, and any singular term a, and any
z, z is a purely referential occurrence of a in S,
From a Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, New York),
p. 140
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only if, for any sentence S' and any singular term
5, if S' is the result of substituting S for z in S
and a=S' expresses a true proposition, then S
expresses a true proposition if and only if S'
expresses a true proposition.
It is easily seen that if (C) is true then (D) is true as well.
For suppose that (D) is false. Then there is a sentence S
which contains an occurrence of a singular term a,
S5: __ a ,__1
and a sentence S2 which is the result of substituting S for the
S2
displayed occurrence of a inS.
Fa=sfl expresses a true proposition, SS2' does not express a
true proposition and either the displayed occurrence of a in S1
or the displayed occurrence of S in S2 is purely referential.
But then (C) is false.
Perhaps it would be thought that (C) is merely one half of
a definition of 'a purely referential occurrence of a singular
term'. It would then be argued that if (C) is a truth of
definition, (D) must be true. But, as we have seen, if (D) and
(J) are true, Quine's thesis is true; and surely, the argument
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would go on, (J) is a truth of standard semantics; hence
Quine's thesis is true. Now I think that if (J) is to appear
as a premise in any argument for Quine's thesis, we had better
not construe (C) as partly defining 'a purely referential
occurrence'. Notice that (C) states that an occurrence of a
singular term in a sentence is purely referential only if its
position in that sentence is referentially transparent. But
if (C) is taken as defining 'a purely referential occurrence',
then
(J) the occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be
bound by a quantifier outside that sentence only if
that occurrence is purely referential,
means that
(J') the occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be
bound by a quantifier outside that sentence only if
its position in that sentence is referentially
transparent.41
And (J') is Quine's thesis. Hence, if (C) is taken as defining
40q4See Kaplan's Step 3.
4See the definition of 'a referentially transparent
position', sec. (1.1).
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'a purely referential occurrence', (J) can appear as a premise
in an argument for Quine's thesis only on pain of circularity.
In Section (1.1) I proposed that we take the following
principle (E) as explicative of the notion of a purely
referential occurrence of a singular term.
(E) For any sentence S, any non-vacuous singular term a,
and any z, z is a purely ,referential occurrence of
a in S, only if, for any S', if S' is the result of
substituting, for z in S, a variable which does not
occur in S, then S' is an open sentence, and S
expresses a true proposition if and only if whatever
z refers to satisfies S'.
I argued that (E) is a weaker principle than (C); that though
(D) is a consequence of (C), it is not a consequence of (E).
If (E) is true then it is true that
(i) if a sentence S1 contains an occurrence of a singular
term a, and
(ii) if S2 is the result of substituting p for an
occurrence z of a in Sl, and
(iii) ra=p' expresses a true proposition, but
(iv) rg 2 does not express a true proposition, then
(v) either z Ci.e. the specified occurrence of a in S )
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or the corresponding occurrence of p in S2 is not
purely referential.
But it is not a consequence of (E) that given (1) - (iv), both
z and the corresponding occurrence of P in S2 are not purely
referential.- Thus, it is not incompatible with (E) that the
occurrence of '9' in
(7) It is necessary that (9 is odd)
be purely referential, and
It is necessary that x is odd
be an open sentence, even though the occurrence of 'the number
of planets' in
(8) It is necessary that (the number of planets is odd)
is not purely referential. Note that even if the occurrence
of '9' in (7) is purely referential, the position of the
occurrences of '9' in (7) is not referentially transparent. What
Kaplan describes as 'the error of Step 4' is presumably the
error of thinking that (D) is a consequence of (E). In my
opinion it is not clear from Quine's writings that he is guilty
of this error; Quine endorses (C), and (D) is a consequence of
(C). Kaplan writes that the error of Step 4 'is represented (in
85
later writings) by an unjustified shift from talk about
occurrences to talk about positions.' But notice that (C)
does in fact license this shift, for (C) states that an
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is purely
referential only if its position in that sentence is
referentially transparent. If this shift from talk about
occurrences to talk about positions is unjustified then (C)
is linjustified.
It is, I think worth emphasizing that if (E) is true and
(D) is false then the following principle (K) is false.
(K) For any S and S' and any (non-vacuous) singular term
a, if S is an open sentence in one variable and S'
is the result of substituting a Zor the free
occurrences of thac variable in S, then the referent
of a satisfies S if and only if S' expresses a true
proposition.
Suppose that (E) is true, and (D) is false. There are then
senenesSan S2, and singular terms a and p3
S5: _ _ a_ _ _
S2
such that
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(i) S contains an occurrence of a,
(ii) S2 is the result of substituting S for the displayed
occurrence of a in S1,
(iii) a=3 expresses a true proposition,
(iv) S1 S2 does not express a true proposition, and
(v) either the displayed occurrence of a in S1 or the
displayed occurrence of S in S2 is purely referential.
Suppose that the displayed occurrence of a (a) in S 1(S1 2is
purely referential. Since (E) is true, there is an open
sentence S3 and a variable y which does not appear in S1,
S3'
such that
i) S3 is the result of substituting y for the displayed
occurrence of a in S1, and
(ii) the referent of a (5) satisfies S3 if and only if
S1(S 2)is true.
But since a=O expresses a true proposition, the referent of
S (a) satisfies S3 if and only if S1(S2) is true. But since
S,**S2 does not express a true proposition, (K) is false.
Hence, if (E) is true, and (K) is true, then CD) is true.
It is (K) then that we need to prove, in order to prove
Quine's thesis.
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Quine has frequently observed that if we try to apply
existential generalization to
(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd,
we obtain
(15) (3x) It is necessary that x is odd.
But, he asks rhetorically, what is this object which is
necessarily odd? In the light of (7) it is 9, but in the light
of
(6) 9 = the number of planets,
and
(30) It is not necessary that the number of planets is
odd,
it is not. Now, it is not clear to me why these observations
are relevant to Quine's thesis. Perhaps, as Cartwright says,
we should construe Quine as pointing out that a double
application of existential generalization on the conjunction
of (6), (7), and (30) yields
(31) (3x)(By)(x=y-it is necessary that x is odd-
it is not necessary that x is odd).4 2
4'Indiscernibility Principles' in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, vol. pp. 302-303.
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But now consider the schema
(13) (Vx)(Vy)(x=y + (Fx -+ Fy)).
If
(31') (Vx)(Vy)(x=y + (it is necessary that x is odd +
it is necessary that y is odd))
is an instance of (13), then (31) is in conflict with the claim
that every instance of (13) is true. I have argued that the
validity of (13) is fundamental to the intent of identity and
quantification. I would, therefore, argue that if (31') is an
instance of (13) then (31) is not true. Now, presumably the
principle of existential generalization whose double application
to the conjunction of (6), (7), and (30) yields (31) is this:
(G') For any sentences S, and S', any non-vacuous singular
term a, and any variable 1, if S does not occur free
in S, and S' is the result of substituting S for one
or more occurrences of a in S, then S expresses a
true proposition only if r(35 )S'' expresses a true
proposition.
Since the conjunction of (6), (7), and (30) is true, either
(G') is false, or (31') Is not an instance of (13). Now, I
think that it should be granted that (31') is an instance of
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(13) if and only if 'It is necessary that x is odd' is an open
sentence. Hence, it should be granted that either (G') is false,
or 'It is necessary that x is odd' is not an open sentence. Now,
I do not see why this is any evidence for Quine's thesis. That
(G') is false is established by the facts that
(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size
expresses a true proposition, but
(4') (3x) x was so-called because of his size
does not express any proposition, and hence does not express a
true proposition. What is obviously needed is an argument which
shows that (31) is obtained from the conjunction of (6), (7),
and (30) by the application of a true principle of existential
generalization.
Cartwright notes:
Perhaps Quine is to be understood, rather, as follows.
It would be counter to astronomy to deny
(32) (Vy)(y=Phosphorus cy=Hesperus)
and an application of existential generalization to
the conjunction of (32) with
(33) astro Hesperus = Phosphorus
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would yield
(34) (3x) ((Vy) (y=Phosphorus y=x)'
astro x = Phosphorus.
Again, no-one could reasonably deny
(35) (Vy)(y=Phosphorus *y=Phosphorus),
and an application of existential generalization to
the conjunction of (35) with
(36) - astro Phosphorus = Phosphorus
would yield
(37) (3x) ((Vy) (y=Phosphorus c y=x)-
- astro x = Phosphorus).
Consider, th'en, the thing identical with Phosphorus.
Is it a thing such that it is a truth of astronomy
that it is identical with Phosphorus? In view of
(34) and (37), no answer could be given. There is
some one thing identical with Phosphorus. But
there is no settling the question whether it satisfies
'astro x = Phosphorus'. To permit quantification
into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the
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fundamental intent of objectual quantification.
Cartwright sees in this reasoning an argument in defence of the
validity of (13). Surely the conjunction of (34) and (37), he
suggests, is not true; - for if it were, the question: 'Is the
thing identical with Phosphorus such that it is a truth of
astronomy that it is identical with Phosphorus?' would be
intelligible, but no answer could be given to it. Hence, the
conjunction of (34) and (37) is either unintelligible or false.
However, seen as an argument for Quine's thesis, this
reasoning, I believe, is invalid. The last sentence, i.e.
'To permit quantification into opaque constructions
is thus at odds with the fundamental intent of
objectual quantification.'
does not follow from the rest. Consider, for instance, the
following argument:
Perhaps Quine is to be understood, rather, as follows.
It would be counter to history to deny
(32') (Vy)(y = Reagan y = the president of
the U.S.),
43 'Indiscernibility Principles' in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, vol. , pp. 302-3. I have changed the numbering
to conform to that of the present essay.
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and an application of existential generalization to
the conjunction of (32') with
(33') It was not the case in 1972 that the
president of the U.S. was identical with
Reagan,
would yield
(34') (3x)((Vy)(y = Reagan y = x) -it was not
the case in 1972 :that x was identical with
Reagan).
Again, no-one could reasonably deny
(35') (Vy)(y = Reagan c y = Reagan)
and an application of existential generalization
to the conjunction of (35') with
(36') It was the case in 1972 that Reagan was
identical with Reagan,
would yield
(37') (3x)((Vy)(y = Reagan- y = x) - it was the
case in 1972 that x was identical with
Reagan).
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Consider then the thing identical with Reagan. Is
it a thing such that it was the case in 1972 that it
was identical with Reagan? In view of (34') and
(37'), no answer could be given. There is some one
thing identical with Reagan. But there is no settling
the question whether it satisfies 'It was the case in
1972 that x was identical with Reagan.' To permit
quantification into opaque constructions is thus at
odds with the fundamental intent of objectual
quantification.
Surely we must resist the suggestion that no answer could be
given to the question: 'Is the thing identical with Reagan
such that it was the case in 1972 that it was identical with
Reagan?'. The question is intelligible; there is indeed a
thing identical with Reagan; and there is little doubt that
this thing is such that it was the case in 1972 that it was
identical with Reagan. The conjunctioa of (34') and (37') is,
therefore, not unintelligible; it is false. Now it ought to be
noted, as both Quine and Cartwright emphasize, that the intelli-
gibility of this question or the intelligibility of the conjunc-
tion of (34') and (37') is not guaranteed simply by the intelli-
bility of quantification and the intelligibility of the role of
'It was the case in 1972 that' as an operator on closed sentences.
Cartwright writes:
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The symbol '' is sometimes so used that r0 5i counts
as true if and only if 4 itself is necessary. If
that is all there is to go on, we have no option but
to count the 'o'-construction opaque and hence
(i) (Vx)(Vy)(x=y-+(ox=x-+ox=y))
unintelligible. But (i),
(ii) (Vx) 0 (x=x)
and
(iii) (Vx)(Vy)(x=y-+ox=y)
are witnesses to a contemplated transparent 'o'-
construction. Now, the intelligibility of such a
construction is not guaranteed simply by an antece-
dent understanding of quantification and of the
opaque 'o '-construction.4 4
And Quine remarks:
The important point to observe is that granted an
'Indiscernibility Principles' in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, vol. , p. 304. 1 have changed the numbering to
conform to that of the present essay.
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understanding of the modalities (through uncritical
acceptance, for the sake of argument, of the under-
lying notion of analyticity), and given an under-
standing of quantification ordinarily so-called, we
do not come obt automatically with any meaning for
quantified modal sentences. 45
I think that it ought to be conceded that for any referentially
opaque operator I, if all there is to go on about I, is that for
any closed sentence S, FIS is true if and only if S is such and
such, then we do not thereby gain any understanding of rIS1 ,
where S' is an open sentence. The point, I think, is a perfectly
general one; one which is independent of any considerations about
referential opacity. Indeed, it ought to be conceded that for
any operator I, if all there is to go on about I is that for any
closed sentence S, FIS1 is true if and only if S is such and such,
then we do not thereby gain any understanding of rIS', where S'
is an open sentence. Consider, for instance, the operator 'It
is not the case that'. If the only available rule for under-
standing 'It is not the case that' is that
(i) rIt is not the case that S1 is true if and only if
S is not true,
From A Logical Point of View, (Harper & Row, 1963), p. 150
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and quantification is understood, we are not guaranteed any
understanding of
(ii) (3x) It is not the case that x is odd.
For surely,
(iii) (3x) 'x is odd' is not true
does not count as an explanation of (ii). What'is obviously
needed is an explanation of the role of 'It is not the case
that' as an operator on open sentences.
But, now, suppose that
(38) It is not the case that x is odd,
is specified as an open sentence, and the problem of determining
which sequences, if any, satisfy this open sentence is somehow
to be settled. It seems to me that it would not be a necessary
condition for settling this problem that the position of the
occurrence of 'x' in (38) be counted as referentially transparent;
for, I am inclined to think that this problem is to be settled
independently of any considerations about what singular terms
(other than the variables) or what kinds of singular terms
(other than the variables) are available. The point is not that
there is some doubt about the referential transparency of the
position of the occurrence of 'x' in (38); - it is rather that
97
the referential transparency of this position is not a necessary
condition for settling the problem of determining which sequences,
if any, satisfy (38). Similarly, suppose that
(39) Necessarily x is odd,
and
(40) It was the case in 1972 that x was identical with
Reagan
are specified as open sentences, and the problem of determining
which sequences, if any, satisfy these open sentences is somehow
to be settled. It is not a necessary condition for settling
this problem that the position of the occurrences of 'x' in (39)
and (40) respectively be counted as referentially transparent.
But surely if (39) and (40) are open sentences, then the free
occurrences of the variable 'x' in these sentences may be bound
by quantifiers outside of these sentences. Why is it, then,
claimed, as Quine apparently does that 'to permit quantification
into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the fundamental
intent of objectual quantification.'
One cannot help but think that at issue are some principles of
instantiation and generalization. If (39) is an open sentence
and the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (39) is not
referentially transparent then tate following principle of
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existential generalization is not true.
(L) For any sentences S and S', any non-vacuous singular
term a, and any variable 5, if $ does not occur free
in S, and S' is an open sentence, which is the result
of substituting S for one or more occurrences of a
in S, then S expresses a true proposition only if
r( 3 5 )S' 1 expresses a true proposition.
If the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (39) is not
referentially transparent, then there are singular terms a and
a such that
F(a- necessarily a is odd - (necessarily $ is
odd))-'
expresses a true proposition. But if (39) is an open sentence,
then surely
x=y -necessarily x is odd - (necessarily y is odd)
is an open sentence as well. And if (L) is true, then
(3x)(3y)(x=y -necessarily x is odd - (necessarily
y is odd))
expresses a true proposition. But that coniilicts with the
validity of (13). Granted that (13) Is valid, then either (L)
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is not true or (39) is not an open sentence in which the
position of the occurrence of 'x' is referentially opaque.
(L) is closely related to a principle of universal
instantiation.
(M) For any sentences S and S', any non-vacuous singular
term a, and any variable 8, if B does not occur free
in S, and S' is an open sentence which is the result
of substituting 6 for one or more occurrences of a
in S, then r(Vs)S'' expresses a true proposition only
if S expresses a true proposition.
Again, if (39) is an open sentence in which the position of the
occurrence of 'x' is not referentially transparent then (M) is
false. If the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (39) is riot
referernially transparent, then there are singular terms a, and
B, such that
rS=8 - necessarily a is odd - (necessarily a is odd)'
expresses a true proposition. But granted that (13) is valid,
if (39) is an open sentence, then
(Vx)(Vy)(x=y-+ (necessarily x is odd-+necessarily
y is odd))
expresses a true proposition. But if (H) is true, then for any
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non-vacuous singular terms a, and 6,
ras=+ (necessarily a is odd-*necessarily S is odd)'
expresses a true proposition. But that conflicts with the claim
that there are singular terms a and 1 such that
ra'=- necessarily a is odd - (necessarily 6 is odd)'
expresses a true proposition. Hence, granted that (13) is valid,
either (M) is false, or (39) is not an open sentence in which thc1
position of the occurrence of 'x' is not referentially transparent.
It should be noticed that (M) is true if and only if the
principle (K) of a few pages back is true. (K) is the principle
that
for any S and S', and any non-vacuous singular term
a, if S is an open sentence in one free variable and
S' is the result of substituting a for the free
occurrences of that variable in S, then the referent
of a satisfies S if and only if S' expresses a true
proposition.
Suppose that (M) is false. Then there is a sentence S, and a
non-vacuous singular term a, and a variable S which does not
occur free in 5, and 5' is the result of substituting 13 for one
or more occurrences of a in S, rg)gS,,) expresses a true
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proposition, but S does not express a true proposition. But if
r(VS)s'1 expresses a true proposition then every thing satisfies
S'; and if everything satisfies S', then presumably the referent
of a satisfies S'. But since S does not express a true
proposition (K) is false. Hence, if (K) is true, (M) is true.
On the other hand, suppose that (M) is true. Granted that (13)
is valid, for any open sentences S1 and S2, each in one free
variable, if S contains one or more free occurrences of a
variable a, and S2 is the result of substituting a variable S
for the free occurrences of a in Si, then
r(Va) (Va) (a=a + (S 2 c"S 1))
expresses a true proposition. But given some non-vacuous
singular term a', if S' is the result of substituting a' for the
free occurrences of the variable a in 3V, then if (M) is true,
r(VS)(a'=a 
_+(S 2 S)-
expresses a true proposition. But in that case the referent of
a' satisfies
S2
But since S2 is an open sentence in one free variable and 5' is
a closed sentence, if the referent of a' satisfies
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S2
the referent of a' satisfies S2 if and only if S' is true.
Hence, if (1) is true, (K) is also true.
I had argued that we need to prove (K) in order to prove
Quine's thesis. It is easily seen that granted that (13) is
valid, if (M) (or equivalently (K)) is true then Quine's thesis
is true. For if (13) is valid then for any open sentences S1
and S2, each in one free variable, if a variable a occurs free
in S1 and S2 is the result of substituting $ for free occurrences
of a in S1 , then
r (Va) (VS) (a=S + (Sl -+S)2
expresses a true proposition. But if S ' is the result of
substituting any singular term a' for all free occurrences of
a in S1, and S2' is the result of substituting any singular term
' for all free occurrences of S in S2, and, if (M) is true,
then
1 2(S'+S2
expresses a true proposition. But then the positions of the
occurrences of any free variable in S. are referentially
transparent. Hence, granted the validity of (13), if (M) is
true, then the positions of the occurrences of any free variable
in any open sentence are referentially transparent. But, then,
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Quine's thesis is true, since, surely, it is only the free occur-
rences of a variable in an open sentence which may be bound by a
quantifier outside of that open sentence.
But is (M) true? It seems to me that (M) is not a principle
which is fundamental to the intent of objectual quantification.
Objectual quantification is best understood in terms of satis-
faction of open sentences, and it appears to me that the pro-
blems of determining what it is for a sequence to satisfy an
open sentence are to be settled independently of any considerations
about what kinds of singular term other than the variable are
available. It seems, then, that it is not required for an under-
standing of objectual quantification that the principle that the
position of an occurrence of a free variable in an open sentence
is referentially transparent be regarded as true. But since, this
principle is true if (M) is true, a defence of (M) is, apparently,
not to be found in any appeal to the fundamental intent of ob-
jectual quantification. Indeed, one may find, in the facts that
there are singular terms a and P, such that
a=P-+ (it is necessary that a is odd -+ it is
necessary that P is odd)'
does not express a true proposition, whereas
(Vx) (Vy) (x=y +± (it is necessary that x is odd
+~ it is necessary that y is odd)
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expresses a true proposition, evidence that (M) is not true.
I-I 0 LII z H
r
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It is a compelling idea that bodies, or material objects,
are distinct only if they do not share all their parts. The
idea is elegantly economical; and, if it is true, then we also
know what relation the expression 'is constituted of' in
Wiggins' example 'The jug is constituted of a collection of
china-bits' stands for.1 Surely, one wants to say that for
any material objects x, and y,
(1) x is constituted of y -+ x and y have the same parts.
But, then, given the idea that for any material objects x, and y,
(2) x is distinct from y -* x and y do not have the same
parts,
it follows that for any material objects x, and y,
(3) x is constituted of y -+ x is identical with y.
On the other hand, if (3) is true, and for any material object x,
(4) (3z) x is constituted of z,
then, for any material objects x, and y,
Sameness and Substance, (Basis Blackwell, 1980), p. 31
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(5) x is identical with y -+ x is constituted of y.
For suppose that x is identical with y. Given (4), there is
something, z, such that x is constituted of z; and if (3) is
true, x is identical with z. But, then y is identical with z;
and since x is constituted of z, x is constituted of y. Hence,
if (1), (2), and (3) are true, then it is also true that for
any material objects x, and y,
(6) x is constituted of y c x is identical with y.
There is another, and, I think, a more urgent consideration
that makes the idea that distinct material objects do not share
all their parts attractive. Consider, for instance, this silver
chain which is on my table now. It would be natural to think
that there is such a thing as the mass of silver which is on my
table now, and that this silver chain which is on my table now
is made of it. But if there is indeed such a thing as the mass
of silver which is on my table now, and it is distinct from this
silver chain which is on my table now, then either there are at
least two silver chains which occupy exactly the same place on
my table now, or the mass of silver which is on my table now is
not a silver chain. The former alternative is contrary to the
plainest common sense; and the latter leaves one wondering why
it is that the mass of silver which is on my table now is not a
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silver chain. It has, after all, exactly the same parts as a
silver chain, and these parts are organized in exactly the same
way as the parts of a silver chain. What is it then that pre-
vents the mass of silver which is on my table now from being
a silver chain?
In this essay I examine the claim that material objects
are distinct only if they do not share all their parts, and I
argue that, notwithstanding its attractiveness, the claim is
false.
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2.1 PARTHOOD AND PERSISTENCE
It is tempting to think that the logic of parthood is the
Leonard-Goodman Calculus of Individuals.2 This calculus takes
a two-place predicate 'D' as primitive, where under the intended
interpretation 'Dxy' is to be read as 'x is discrete from y',
and defines'Pxy' (read as: x is part of y), 'Oxy' (read as: x
overlaps y), and 'FuxS' (read as: x fuses a set S) as follows:
(CI-Df. 1)
(CI-Df. 2)
(CI-Df. 3)
Pxy = df. (Vz)(Dzy -+ Dzx)
Oxy =df. (3z)(Pzx'Pzy)
FuxS =df (Vy)(Dyx - (Vz)(zES -+ Dyz))
The calculus contains the following distinctive axioms:
(Pxy-Pyx) -+ x=y
Oxy c -Dxy
(3x)xES -+ (3y)FuyS
identity axiom
overlap axiom
fusion axiom
Since the logic of identity guarantees that
x=y -+ (Pxx -+ Pxy),
2I1 owe this thought and many others in what follows to
Prof. J. J. Thomson.
Henry S. Leonard and Nelson Goodman, 'The Calculus of
Individuals and Its Uses', Journal of Symbolic Logic, v, 2
(June, 1940). I have changed the notation to conform to that
of the present essay.
(CI-Ax. 1)
(CI-Ax. 2)
(CI-Ax. 3)
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and
xy -±(Pyx-+Pyy),
and, the definition of parthood (CI-Df.1) implies that
(Vx)Pxx,
it is provable in this calculus that
x=y -(Pxy-Pyx).
The fusion axiom says that for any non-empty set there is
an object which fuses it; - that is, given any non-empty set,
there is an object which is discrete from all and only those
things which are discrete from every member of that set. But
it is provable in this calculus that given any non-empty set,
there is exactly one such object. Suppose that S is a non-empty
set. Then given the fusion axiom there is some object, y,
which fuses S. But suppose, there is, also, an object, z, which
fuses S. Given the definition (CI-Df.3), then, all and only
those things are discrete from y which are discrete from every
member of S. But since z fuses S, as well, all and only those
things are discrete from z which are discrete from every member
of S. And hence, all and only those things are discrete from y
which are discrete from z. But then, y is part of z, and, z is
part of y, and given the identity axiom, y is identical with z.
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Hence, for any set S,
(3x)xES -+ (3y)(Vz)(FuzS z=y).
It is also provable in this calculus that every object fuses
the set of which it is the sole member. For given any object x,
and given the fusion axiom, there is an object, y, which fuses
{x}. But then since all and only those things are discrete from
y which are discrete from x, given the identity axiom, y is
identical with x; and hence x fuses {x}.
Under the intended interpretation of this calculus, the
variables 'x', 'yE, etc., are taken as ranging over material
objects. Parts of material objects are themselves construed as
material objects. The variable 'S' ranges over sets of material
objects, and the predicates 'D', 'P', and '0', are seen as
expressing the relations of discreteness, parthood, and overlap
respectively. Notice that since it is a theorem of this calculus
that
(Pxy'Pyx) (Vz)(Pzx Pzy)
the thesis articulated at the beginning of this essay that
material objects are distinct only if they do not share all
their parts is preserved under the intended interpretation of
this calculus. Consider, for instance, the silver chain which
is on my table now. It is made of thirty links, and a clasp.
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Let us call this set of thirty-one objects 'A', and let us
suppose that the time now is t1 . Since A is a non-empty set,
if the axioms of the calculus of individuals are true under
their intended interpretation, then there is such an object
as the fusion of A; and since it is true that
(7) (Vz)(z is discrete from the silver chain on my table
at t1 e(Vw)(wEA-+z is discrete from w)),
if the axioms of the calculus of individuals are true under
their intended interpretation, then
(8) the silver chain on my table at t1 = the fusion of A.
Again, if there is such a thing as the mass of silver on my
table at ti, and the axioms of the calculus of individuals are
true under their intended interpretation, then since it is true
that
(9) (Vz)(z is discrete from the mass of silver on my
table at tc*(Vw)(wEA-+z is discrete from w)),
(10) the n.ass of silver on my table at ti = the fusion
of A,
and, hence,
(11) the silver chain on my table at t1 - the mass of
silver on my table at t1 .
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Notwithstanding the obvious appeal of the calculus of
individuals, there is, I chink, reason to suppose that the
axioms of this calculus are not true under their intended
interpretation. Imagine, for instance, that between t1 and t2
I remove a link from the silver chain which was on my table at
t and drop that link on the floor. Considering that this is an
ordinary silver chain, and considering that the link I have
removed is not of any special significance, it would not be
unreasonable to suppose that the silver chain which was on my
table at t1 has survived this change, and that it continues to
exist in non-scattered form. The idea is not that any silver
chain would survive the loss of some of its links, nor that any
ordinary silver chain would survive the loss of any number of
insignificant links, but that some silver chains do survive
the loss of some of their links, and the silver chain which was
on my table at t1 is one of these. There is, now, at t2 , a
silver chain on my table, and it consists of the clasp and
twenty-nine of the thirty links which formed the silver chain
which was on my table at t1 . Considering the circumstances, it
seems to me that it would be unreasonable to deny that
(12) the silver chain on my table at t. =
the silver chain'on my table at 2
But notice that a member of the set A is now, at t2, on the
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floor; and so, if there is such a thing as the fusion of A, a
part of this fusion is now on the floor. But no part of the
silver chain which is on my table at t2 is, now, at t 2 on the
floor. Hence, if there is such a thing as the fusion of A, then
(13) the silver chain on my table at t2 # the fusion of A.
On the other hand, as we saw earlier, since A is a non-empty
set, if the axioms of the calculus of individuals are true under
their intended interpretation, then there is such a thing as the
fusion of A, and given (7),
(8) the silver chain on my table at ti = the fusion of A.
The difficulty is that the set of (8), (12), and (13) is
inconsistent.
And there are other inconsistent sets in the offing. For
suppose that between t2 and t3 , I pick up the link on the floor
and replace it in its original position in the silver chain
which is on my table at t2. It would be unreasonable to deny
that
(14) the silver chain on my table at t2 = the silver
chain on my table at t3'
But since the set A is non-empty, if the axioms of the calculus
of individuals are true under their intended interpretation,
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there is such a thing as the fusion of A; and since it is also
true that
(15) (Vz)(z is discrete from the silver chain on my table
at t3 m (Vw)(w(A -+ z is discrete from w)),
(16) the silver chain on my table at t3 = the fusion of A.
But now, the set of (13), (14), and (16) is inconsistent.
And again, if instead of removing just one link between
t and t2 , as I supposed I did, if all the links from the silver
chain on my table at t1 were separated from one another, and
scattered on the floor between t1 and t2 , one would be inclined
to say that
(17) the silver chain on my table at t1 does not exist
at t2'
But since every member of A exists at t2 , if the axioms of the
calculus of individuals are true under their intended interpre-
tation, then
(18) the fusion of A exists at t2.
However, the set of (8), (17), and (18) is inconsistent.
It will be immediately suggested that these difficulties
arise because of our failure to take time into account.
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Consider, for instance, the set of (8), (12), and (13). It is
going to be suggested that the propositions expressed by these
sentences must be distinguished from those expressed by
(8') It is the case at t1 that the silver chain on my
table at t1 = the fusion of A,
(12') It is the case at t2 that the silver chain on my
table at t = the silver chain on my table at t2'
and
(13') It is not the case at t2 that the silver chain on my
table at t2 = the fusion of A,
respectively; and that it is the set of these latter propositions
rather than those expressed by (8), (12), and (13) which
correctly describe the case at hand. But unlike the set of (8),
(12), and (13), it would be said that the set of (8'), (12'),
and (13') is not inconsistent. Similarly, the propositions
expressed by (14), and (16), according to this proposal, are to
be distinguished from those expressed by
(14') It is the case at t3 that the silver chain on my
table at t2= the silver chain on my table att3
and
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(16') It is the case at t 3 that the silver chain on my
table at t3 the fusion of A,
respectively. And though the conjunctior of (13), (14), and
(16) is inconsistent, it would be suggested that that is not a
problem for the intended interpretation of the axioms of the
calculus of individuals since the case in question is correctly
described instead by the conjunction of (13'), (14'), and (16'),
which is not inconsistent.
Now, I think that it is not clear how, for instance, (8'),
(12'), and (13') are to be understood. (8') admits of a reading
under which it expresses the proposition which is expressed by
(8.1) It is the case at t1 that (3x)(3y)(x = the silver
chain on my table at t1y = the fusion of A-x=y).
But it also admits of a reading under which it expresses the
proposition which is expressed by
(8.2) (3x)(3y)(x = the silver chain on my table at t -
y = the fusion of A-it is the case at t1 that x=y).
The ambiguity in (8') is, I think, due not to a semantic ambiguity
in any of the expressions in that sentence; it is, instead, a
syntactic ambiguity which arises from assigning different scopes
to the occurrence of 'It is the case at t1 that' in (8').
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Similarly, (12') admits of a reading under which it expresses
the proposition which is expressed by
(12.1) It is the case at t2 that (3x)(3y)(x = the silver
chain on my table at t1 -y = the silver chain on my
table at t2xy).
But, it also admits of another reading under which it expresses
the proposition which is expressed by
(12.2) (3x)(3y)(x = the silver chain on my table at t1 -
y = the silver chain on my table at t2 -it is the
case at t2 that x=y).
Likewise, (13') admits of a variety of readings among which are
those identified by
(13.1) It is not the case at t2 that (3x)(3y)(x = the silver
chain on my table at t2-y = the fusion of A-x=y)
and
(13.2) (3x)(3y)(x = the silver chain on my table at t2 0
y = the fusion of A-it is not the case at t2 that
x=y).
It is, I think worth stressing that the conjunction of
(8.2), (12.2), and (13.2) expresses a proposition which is not
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true. The conjunction of these sentences expresses a true
proposition only if
(19) (3x)(3y)(3z)(x = the silver chain on my table at t -
y = the fusion of A-z = the silver chain on my table
at t2-it is the case at t1 that x=y-it is the case
at t2 that x-z-it is not the case at t2 that y=z)
expresses a true proposition. And, obviously, (19) expresses a
true proposition only if
(20) (3x)(3y)(3z)(It is the case at t1 that x=y-it is the
case at t2 that x=zit is not the case at t2 that
y=z)
expresses a true proposition.
Now, some people seem to suggest that (20), in fact, does
express a true proposition and that the cases of fusion and
fission are evidence for it. This, I think, is simply a confusion;
and it ought be recognized that provided that the quantifiers in
(20) are interpreted objectually, the claim that (20) expresses a
true proposition is false. For suppose that the proposition ex-
pressed by (20) is true, and suppose that the time now is t'.
There is then a sequence S, such that
(i) S satisfies at t' the open sentence
(It is the case at t1 that x=y'
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it is the case at t2 that x=z-
it is not the case at t2 that z=y).
But then,
(ii) S satisfies at t' the open sentence
It is the case at t1 that x=y,
and
(iii) S satisfies at t' the open sentence
It is the case at t2 that x=z,
and also,
(iv) S satisfies at t' the open sentence
It is not the case at t2 that z=y.
But surely, for any sequence x, any open sentence $, and any
times m and n,
(21) x satisfies at m the open sentence $ if and only if
x satisfies at n the open sentence rlIt is the case
at m that 4'.
But given (21), and (ii)
(v) S satisfies at t1 the open sentence
x=y,
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and given (21), and (ii)
(vi) S satisfies at t2 the open sentence
x=z.
But now given (v),
(vii) S satisfies at t1 every instance of the schema
Fx -t Fy,
but, since
It is the case at t2 that x=x -+ it is the case
at t2 that x-y
is an instance of 'Fx -* Fy', given (vii),
(viii) S satisfies at t1 the open sentence
It is the case at t2 that x=x +
It is the case at t2 that x=y.
But since
(ix) S satisfies at t1 the open sentence
It is the case at t2 that x=x,
given (viii),
(x) S satisfies at t1 the open sentence
It is the case at t2 that x=y.
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And given (21) and (x),
(xi) S satisfies at t 2 the open sentence
x=y
But now given (vi) and (xi)
(xii) S satisfies at t 2 the open sentence
z=y
and given (21) and (xii),
(xiii) S satisfies at t' the open sentence
It is the case at t 2 that z=y.
But (xiii) contradicts (iv); and hence the proposition expressed
by (20) is not true.
Advocates of the view that (20) expresses a true proposition
would perhaps object to my claim that if a sequence satisfies at
t the open sentence 'x=y', then it satisfies at t1 every instance
of the schema 'Fx -+ Fy'. In discussions of this issue one
frequently finds the remark that the substitution class of 'F' in
x=y - (Fx -+ Fy)
must be suitably restricted in order to rule out false instances.
This remark calls for explanation. If the restriction on admis-
sible substituends for 'F' in this schema is used to fix the
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meaning of '=', then '=' would not express the relation of
identity, since the relation may not be a total indiscernibility
relation; i.e., objects which are related by this relation may
not be indiscernible with respect to every open sentence. On
the other hand, if the object of the restriction is to rule out
what are claimed to be false instances of this schema, then it
is pointless, since there simply are not false instances of
this schema.4
Some advocates of the view that not all identities are
permanent may object to my treating
It is the case at t1 that x=y
as an open sentence. It should be noted that the sentential
operator 'It is the case at t1 that' is referentially opaque.
If t1 is sometime during 1964, then
It is the case at t1 that the president of the U.S.
is a Democrat
expresses a true proposition, but
It is the case at t1 that Reagan is a Democrat
does not express a true proposition; even though
See Richard Gartwright, 'Indiscernibility Principles'
Micdoest Studies in Philosophy, vol.
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Reagan = the president of the U.S.
expresses a true proposition, and
Reagan is a Democrat,
and
The president of the U.S. is a Democrat
both express false propositions. Now, Quine has claimed that
it is illicit to put a variable of quantification in the scope
of an opaque operator to be bound by a quantifier outside of
that scope. Since, 'It is the case at t1 that' is a referentially
opaque operator, if Quine is right then
It is the case at t1 that x=y
is not an open sentence. I have argued in chapter 1 that
Quine's claim is false. But it should be noticed that even if
Quine's claim is true, it is of no help to an advocate of the
view that some identities are temporary, since an identity is
temporary only if there is a sequence which satisfies the open
sentence
It is the case at t1 that x=y
and fails to satisfy the open sentence
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It is the case at t 2 that x=y
where t1 and t 2 are distinct times.
The temptatior to think that (20) expresses a true
proposition perhaps arises from a failure to distinguish it
from the claim that not all true statements of identity are
permanently true. But it ought to be recognized that, though
the latter claim is true, it does not imply (20).
I have argued that the proposition expressed by (20)
cannot be true. But since the proposition expressed by the
conjunction of (8.2), (12.2), and (13.2) can be true only if
the proposition expressed by (20) can be true, the proposition
expressed by the conjunction of these three sentences cannot
be true either. But, I do not think that this is a result
which should dismay a friend of the calculus of individuals.
A friend of the calcul'us of individuals would be content to
affirm that the proposition expressed by the conjunction of
(8.1), (12.1), and (13.1) is true. Since the conjunction of
(8.1), (12.1), and (13.1) does not imply the conjunction of
(8.2), (12.2), and (13.2), the falsity of the proposition ex-
pressed by the latter conjunction is not a reason against the
intended interpretation of the axioms of the calculus of indivi-
duals. However, I shall argue that the conjunction of (8.1),
(12.1), and (13.1) faces an independent difficulty of its own -
one which a friend of the calculus of individuals ought to try
rt 0 O
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2.2 TENSE
I have suggested that the claim that the proposition
expressed by the conjunction of (8.1), (12.1), and (13.1) is
true presents a difficulty for the intended interpretation of
the axioms of the calculus of individuals. The difficulty I
have in mind is this. If (8.1) expresses a true proposition,
then, at t1 , there is such a thing as the fusion of A and it
is identical with the silver chain on my table at tI; and if
(12.1) expresses a true proposition as well, then, at t2, there
is such a thing as the silver chain on my table at t2 and it is
Identi'al with the thing which, at t1 , fused A. But now, if
(13.1) also expresses a true proposition then either at t2 there
is no such thing as the fusion of A, or at t2 the thing which
fuses A is not identical with the silver chain on my table at
t2. However, if the axioms of the calculus of individuals are
true under their intended interpretation, then, since every
member of A exists at t2, at t2there is such a thing as the
fusion of A; and hence, at t2 the thing which fuses A is not
identical with the silver chain on my table at t2 . But since
the silver chain on my table at t2 is the thing which fused A
at t,,the thing which fuses A at t2 is not identical with the
thing which fused A at t1 ; - and hence, if the conjunction of
(8.1), (12.1), and (13.1) expresses a t'rue proposition and the
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axioms of the calculus of individuals are true under their
intended interpretation, then distinct objects fuse A at t1
and t 2 .
Now, I think that it is not easy to see how the idea that
distinct objects may fuse the same set at different times may
be reconciled with the intended interpretation of the calculus
of individuals. If the axioms of this calculus are true under
their intended interpretation, then for any non-empty set of
material objects there is exactly one thing which fuses that
set; and hence for any non-empty set of material objects there
is such a thing as the fusion of that set. But the axioms of
the calculus make no explicit reference to time and under their
intended interpretation they are not construed as asserting
that any non-empty set of material objects is fused at a time.
Indeed, the calculus is most naturally interpreted as making
untensed and non-dated claims. Now what I envisage as a
difficulty for the intended interpretation of this calculus is
not that if distinct objects fuse A at different times, then
there is no such thing as the fusion of A. For surely distinct
individuals have been presidents of the U.S. at different times,
but it is false that there is no such thing as the president of
the U.S., and similarly, though different numbers may have
numbered the planets at different times, it is false that there
is no such thing as the number of the planets. The difficulty
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is that if the conjunction of (8.1), (12.1), and (13.1)
expresses a true proposition and there is such a thing as
the fusion of A, then, as in the case of 'The president of
the U.S.' and 'The number of the planets', 'the fusion of A'
must be understood as containing an indexical element or a
tense, which in a suitable sentential context contributes
towards fixing the reference of that expression. And if 'the
fusion of A' is construed in this way, then the axioms of the
calculus must themselves be reinterpreted as tensed statements;
and, hence, the intended interpretation of the axioms of the
calculus of individuals must be abandoned.
Though the reinterpretation of the axioms of the calculus
of individuals as tensed statements is a radical departure from
the original intended interpretation of these axioms, it is not
unnatural. Indeed if the axioms of this calculus are construed
as statements about objects which survive the loss of some of
their parts, it quite readily suggests itself that the expression
'is part of' be so understood that it may be true, at one time
to say 'x is part of y', and not at another. Now a very natural
way in which the calculus of individuals may be revised as a
tensed calculus of individuals is to take the axioms of this
calculus as being modified by the temporal sentential operator
'It is always the case that'. The operator 'It is always the
case that' is analogous to the modal operator 'It is necessary
130
that'.Where S is a closed sentence, intuitively, rIt is
always the case that S' is true if and only if S is true at
all times; and if S is an open sentence in one variable, then,
intuitively, rIt is always the case that S' is true of an object
x if and only if S is true of x at all times. Thus,
It is always the case that Reagan = Reagan,
is true, but
It is always the case that Reagan = the president
of the U.S.
is not. Similarly, Reagan satisfies the open sentence
It is always the case that x = Reagan,
but he does not satisfy the open sentence
It is always the case that x = the president of
the U.S.
Formally, the semantics for 'It is always the case that' (to
be abbreviated as 'L') may be given following Kripke semantics
for 'o'. 5 A model structure is defined as a triple <G,K,R>
Saul Kripke, 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic'
in Actaz Phi losophica Fennica, 16 (1963), pp. 83-94.
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together with a function, *, where K is a set (the set of
instants or moments), R is a reflexive relation on K, G (the
present moment) is a member of K, and *(H) is a set for each
HEK. Intuitively, *(H) is the set of things which exist at H.
Let U = UHEK4(H), and let Un be the nth cartesian product of U
with itself. A model on a model structure <G,K,R> is a binary
function 4(PnH), where 'Pn ranges over n-adic predicate letters,
'H' ranges over members of K, and $(Pn,H)CUn,where n>1, otherwise
$(PnH) = T or F.
The clauses of the inductive definition are as follows:
(i) For an atomic formula
4(Pnl'''''' xn),H)=T with respect to an assignment
a1, . .. .,a of elements of U to x,1 .. . .,xn, if and only
if <a1 . .. .. ,an>E4(PnH).
(ii) $(-A(x1......xn),H)=T with respect to an assignment
a1 ,. .. .,an of elements of U to x,1 .. . .,xn, if and only
if 4(A(x,1 .. ..,xn),H)$T with respect to that assignment.
(iii) ((A(x,1 .. ..,xn) B(y1.....yn)),H)=T with respect to an
assignment of a1, .. .. ,a of elements of U to x ,....xn'
and b ,....,bn of elements of U to yy..,n if and
only if both $k(A(x1 ,.. . .,xn),H)=T and $(B(y 1 ,. .. . ,yn),H')
=T with respect to that assignment.
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(iv) 4(LA(x.,....,xn),H)=T with respect to a given assignment
if and only if q(A(x1 ,....,xn),H')=T with respect to
that assignment, for every H' such that HRH'.
(v) 4((Vx) (x,y1 ,....,yn),H)=T with respect to an assignmcnt
a,1 ... . ,a of elements of U to y1,....,yn if and only if
for every a(*(H) q(A(x,y1 ,... yn),H)=T with respect to
that assignment of a1 .. .. . ,a to y,1 . . .. ,yn'
For the intended interpretation of 'L', we take R to be a
transitive and a symmetric relation; thus intuitively, all accessible
moments of time are accessible from one another.
The Revised Calculus of Individuals takes the two-place
predicate 'D' as primitive, where under the intended interpreta-
tion, 'Dxy' is to be read as 'x is discrete from y', and defines
'Pxy', 'Oxy', and 'FuxS' as in (CI-Df.1), (CI-Df.2), and
(CI-Df.3) respectively. The calculus contains the following
distinctive axioms:
(RCI.Ax.1) L((Pxy-Pyx) -*x=y) identity axiom
(RCI.Ax.2) L(Oxye*-Dxy) overlap axiom
(RCI.Ax.3) L((3x)x(S-+ (3y)FuyS) fusion axiom
Under the intended interpretation of the axioms of the revised
calculus, the free individial variables are taken as ranging
over material objects which exist now, whereas variables which
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are bound by a quantifier inside the scope of 'L' range over
material objects which exist at any time past, present, or
future. Under the intended interpretation, the fusion axiom
says that for any set of material objects, S, it is always the
case that if there exists amember of S, then there also exists
something which fuses S; or equivalently, that for any set of
material objects, S, if at any time there exists a member of S,
then there also exists at that time something which at that
time fuses S. And, under the intended interpretation the
identity axiom says that for any material objects x, and y,
it is always the case that if x is part of y and y is part of
x, then x is identical with y, or equivalently, that for any
material objects x, and y, if at any time x is part of y and
y is part of x, then at that time x is identical with y.
Now, though under the intended interpretation of the
revised calculus of individuals the verb 'to fuse' is interpreted
as tensed and thus the question 'Does a material object always
fuse the same sets?' becomes intelligible, it may, nevertheless,
be thought that if the axioms of the revised calculus of
individuals are true under their intended interpretation then
material objects cannot survive the loss or removal of any of
their parts. Consider again the silver chain which was on my
table at t1 . I had supposed that between t1 and t 2 I had
removed a link from the silver chain on my table at t1 and
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dropped that link on the floor, and moreover, that the silver
chain on my table at t1 was identical with the silver chain on
my table at t2. Now, if the axioms of the Revised Calculus of
Individuals are true under their intended interpretation then
there is exactly one object, x, which, at ti, fuses the set A,
i.e. the set of thirty links and a clasp which at t1 formed the
silver chain on my table at ti, and since at ti, all and only
those things are discrete from the silver chain on my table at
t which are discrete from every member of A, the silver chain
on my table at t1 is identical with x. Let us call the set of
twenty-nine links and a clasp which remain on my table at t2'
'B'. If the axioms of the revised calculus are true under their
intended interpretation then there is exactly one object which
fuses B at t1. Let us call this object 'Alpha'. Again, if the
axioms of this calculus are true under their intended interpre-
tation, then there is exactly one object, y, which fuses B at
t2; and since at t2 all and only those things are discrete from
the silver chain on my table at t2 which are discrete from every
member of B, the silver chain on my table at t2 is identical
with y. But now, since the silver chain on my table at t2 fuses
the same set at t2 that Alpha fuses at ti, namely B, whatever
is part at t2of the silver chain on my table at t2 is part of
Alpha at t1 . But one of the things which at t2 is part of the
silver chain on my table at t2 is the silver chain on my table
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at t2 itself. But then the silver chain on my table at t2 is,
at t1 , part of Alpha. However, the silver chain on my table at
t2 , by hypothesis, is identical with the silver chain on my
table at ti, and, therefore, the silver chain on my table at
t is, at t1 , part of Alpha. But that is false, since Alpha,
at ti, is a proper part of the silver chain on my table at t1 .
However, this argument is fallacious. The step that since
the silver chain on my table at t2 fuses the same set at t2 that
Alpha fuses at t1 , whatever is at t2 part of the silver chain on
my table at t2 is part of Alpha at t1 does not follow from the
Revised Calculus of Individuals. In general, it is not provable
in the Revised Calculus of Individuals that if an object x fuses
a set S at ti, and y fuses S at t2 then whatever is part of x at
t is part of y at t2.
Though the intended interpretation of the Revised Calculus
of Individuals is not in conflict with the view that the silver
chain on my table at t1 is identical with the silver chain on
my table at t2, it should be noted that it has a consequence
which many would find perplexing. Let us suppose that the
members of B do not lose or acquire any parts between t1 and
t2. Given that Alpha fuses B at t1 , and the silver chain on
mtable at t2 fuses B at t2 , Alpha presumably has the same
atonmic parts (or even proper parts) at t1 that the silver
chain on my table at t2 has at t2 ; and yet Alpha is not
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identical with the silver chain on my table at t2: - this is
so even if the atomic parts of Alpha retain their organizational
structure at t9 . Now I think that it would not be reasonable
to reject the intended interpretation of the Revised Calculus
of Individuals on the ground that it has this consequence,
because I think that there are strong independent reasons for
holding that it is possible for distinct objects to have ex-
actly the same atomic parts at different times.
There is, however, another consideration that weighs
against the intended interpretation of the Revised Calculus of
Individuals. Alpha, it will be remembered, fused B at t . It
would be reasonable to think that Alpha goes on existing after
t1. After all, no part of Alpha was removed between t1 and t2 '
But if it is reasonable to think that Alpha exists at t2, then
it is also equally reasonable to think that Alpha fuses B at t2 '
But if Alpha fuses B at t2 then if the axioms of the Revised
Calculus of Individuals are true under their intended interpreta-
tion, Alpha is identical with the silver chain on my table at t2 '
But that is false, since the silver chain on my table at t2 is
identical with the silver chain on my table at t1 which is dis-
tinct from Alpha. So, though under their intended interpretation
the axioms of the Revised Calculus of Individuals are not in con-
flict with the judgement that the silver chain on my table at t
is identical with the silver chain on my table at t2, they are
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in conflict with the judgement that the silver chain on my
table at t1 is identical with the silver chain on my table at
t2 and that Alpha fuses B at t2.
Some at this stage would perhaps propose to reject my
assumption that the silver chain on my table at t1 is identical
with the silver chain on my table at t2 . But notice that the
intended interpretation of the Revised Calculus of Individuals
gives rise to difficulties parallel to the one I have been
considering if it is assumed that some objects acquire some
parts, that some objects do not survive the removal of some of
their parts, that some objects do not survive certain changes in
the organization of their parts, or that some objects do not
perish if some of their parts perish. I think that we should
try to find a more reasonable alternative before we are forced
to reject all of these assumptions.
Some would perhaps be inclined to reject the fusion axiom.
They might have felt that the fusion axiom is excessively
strong, and that the problem that I have been considering for
the intended interpretation of the Calculus of Individuals
reinforces their claim that the fusion axiom, as it is inter-
preted, is not true. However, it should be noted that an
analogous problem arises even if the fusion axiom is false
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under its intended interpretation. 6 For even if it is not
true that any time at which a member of a set exists, there
also exists something which fuses it, it seems reasonable to
suppose that there does exist something which fuses B at tI and
that it also fuses B at t2 . But then given the identity axiom,
this object is identical with the silver chain on my table at
t2 . But that must be false, since this object is, at ti, a
proper part of the silver chain on my table at t1 which, in turn,
is identical with the silver chain on my table at t2.
And even if no material objects are fusions, it seems
that we can still reconstruct our problem. Following Thomson,
it may be argued that if there is such a thing as the mass of
silver on my table at ti, then it very naturally suggests
itself that
(11) the silver chain on my table at t1 = the mass of
silver on my table at t1 .
But we can also truly say that
(22) The silver chain on my table at t1 is on my table
at t2'
6
See J.J. Thomson: 'Parthood and Identity Across Time',
Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXX, pp. 201-220.
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Now, the conjunction of (11) and (22) entails that
(23) The mass of silver on my table at t1 is on my
table at t2
which is not true, for the mass of silver on my table at t
is only partly on my table at t2 - a part of it is on the floor
at t2. Hence, the identity sentence (11) is false. I think
that this argument does not settle that (11) is false. Notice
that our confidence in asserting (22) comes from the thought
that the silver chain oIL ray table at t1 survived the removal of
a link. But then we, presumably, think that some objects do
not always have the same parts. Now we are given that something
which at t1 was a part of the mass of silver on my table at t
is at t2 not on my table, but that does not give us reason to
believe that the mass of silver on my table at t1 is not on my
table at t2 , unless we are given reason to believe that the mass
of silver on my table at t1 has the same parts at t2 that it
had at t1 .
However, I think that there is still trouble for (11).
It seems to me natural to think that there is not only the mass
of silver on my table at t1 , but there are also several other
quantities (or portions) of silver on my table at t1 , each of
which is a proper part of the mass of silver on my table at t1 .
There is among these quantities of silver on my table at t1 one
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which overlaps with all and only those quantities of silver on
my table at t1 which do not overlap with the link which is on
the floor at t2 . Let us call ihis quantity of silver Beta.
It seems to me very reasonable to assume that Beta exists at
t2 and has at t2 the same parts that it had at t1 . But now if
the link which at t2 is on the floor is, at t2 , not part of
the mass of silver on my table at ti, then, at t2 , Beta and the
mass of silver on my table at t1 have the same parts. But,
then, it would very naturally suggest itself that Beta is
identical with the mass of silver on my table at t1 . But
that must be false since Beta and the mass of silver on my
table at t1 do not have the same parts at t1. Hence (23) is
after all false; but then given that (22) is true, (11) is also
false.
I have argued that the problem that I am raising arises
even if the fusion axiom is false under its intended interpre-
tation, and secondly that this problem arises even if it is
true that a material object fuses a set at one time and fails
to fuse it at another time (even though it exists at that other
time). One of the things which is common to my various
reconstructions of the problem is the assumption that if at any
time some material objects, x, and y, have the same parts then
x is identical with y, or equivalently, given that parthood is,
by definition, a reflexive and a transitive relation, that if at
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any time some material objects x, and y are parts of each other
then x is identical with y. This is indeed guaranteed by the
axiom of identity under its intended interpretation of the
Revised Calculus of Individuals. I have argued that this axiom
does not imply that an object has the same parts at all times
at which it exists and secondly that it is compatible with the
idea that distinct objects have the same atomic (or even
proper) parts at different times.
It would be instructive to compare the issue that I have
raised here concerning the intended interpretation of the axiom
of identity with an analogous issue concerning the axiom of
extensionality for sets or classes. I suppose that most of us
are inclined to think that sets do not undergo change of member-
ship. But one may wonder what underlies our confidence in this
thought. It would not do to appeal to the principle that for
any sets, x, and y
x=y _+ (Vz)(zEx -+ zEy);
for that does not establish that sets do not lose or gain
members any more than an appeal to the principle that for any
material objects x, and y,
x=y +~ (Vz)(z is a property of x -+ z is a property of y)
establishes that material objects do not lose or gain properties.
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On the other hand, the axiom of extensionality, i.e. that for
any sets x, and y,
(Vz)(zExc zEy)-+x=y
does not establish either that sets do not lose or gain
members. Suppose that a set S has at t exactly three
members, x, y, and z. Suppose, moreover, that between t
and t2 , z goes out of existence. At t2 there is a set, call
it 'S2', which has, at t2 , exactly two members, x and y.
Someone who thought that S1 survived the loss of z would be
inclined to say that
(24) It is the case at t2 that S,=S2'
Now if we are to consider the question of whether sets survive
the loss or gain of members at all seriously, we had better
construe the axiom of extensionality as a tensed statement or
a statement with temporal qualifications which asserts that for
any sets x, and y, if at any time x, and y have the same
members then x is identical with y; i.e.,
(25) It is always the case that
[(Vz)(zEx 'zEy) -+x=y]
But now notice that the observation that SS does not have the
same members at t1 as S2 has at t2 does not imply that the
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conjunction of (24) and (25) is false. What seems to be
missing is the claim that S2 has the same members at t1 as it
had at t2 . But we cannot assume that without begging the
question.
There is, however, still trouble for (24); the claim that
S =S2. Given that S1 exists at ti, there is another set, call
it 'S'', which has as members at t1 just x and y. I think that
we are entitled to ask: what happened to S' at t2? It would be
unreasonable to deny that
(26) S' has at t2 the same members as it had at t1 .
But if (26) expresses a true proposition then, at t2 , S' has
the same members that S2 has at t2 And given that (25) expresses
a true proposition, at t2 , S' is identical with S2. But if (24)
expresses a true proposition then, at t2 , S' is identical with
S . But then, at ti, S' is identical with S . However, that
is false, since, at t1 , S' is a proper subset of Sl. Now, I
think that we simply cannot deny (25), i.e. the axiom of
extensionality; it defines the concept Set; and we are not
really in a position to say that (26) expresses a false
proposition. Hence, it is reasonable to deny the identity
statement (24) - and, in general, it is reasonable to deny that
sets undergo changes of membership. Now, my argument against
the intended interpretation of the axiom of identity of the,
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Revised Calculus of Individuals has a similar form. I have
argued that the conjunction of
(12) The silver chain on my table at ti = silver
chain on my table at t2'
(27) L[(Vz)(Pzx *-+ Pzy)-+ x=y],
and
(28) There is something which fuses B both at t1 and t2
expresses a proposition which cannot be true, if the silver
chain on my table at t2 and the thing which fuses B at t1 do
not have the same parts at t1 but the silver chain on my table
at t2 and the thing which fuses B at t2 have the same parts at
t2 . I think that we cannot reasonably deny (12). Material
objects do, after all, lose and gain parts - and, in any case,
there would still be trouble even if we denied (12); and we are
not really in a position to deny (28). Hence, it is reasonable
to believe that (27) (or, equivalently, the identity axiom of
the Revised Calculus of Individuals) is not true under its in-
tended interpretation. If (27) is not true under its intended
interpretation, then, I think it shall pay us to try to find a
replacement for it - one which preserves at least some of the
intuitions which make (27) so compelling. Professor Thomson,
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in her paper, 'Parthood and Identity Across Time', offers
such a proposal. 7
Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXX, pp. 201-220
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2.3 THOMSON'S CROSS-TEMPORAL CALCULUS OF INDIVIDUALS
Thomson proposes that we take a three place predicate
'Dxy@t' as primitive and read it as: 'x is discrete from y
at t'. For the intended interpretation, the individual
variables, 'x', 'y', etc. are taken as ranging over objects
which exist at one time or another, and the temporal variable
't' is taken as ranging over time-points. Thomson's cross-
temporal Calculus of Individuals defines 'Ex@t' (read as: x
exists at t), 'Pxy@t' (read as: x is part of y at t), 'Oxy@t'
(read as: x overlaps y at t) and 'FuxS@t' (read as: x fuses
a set S at t) as follows:8
(CCI-Df.1)
(CCI-Df.2)
(CCI-Df.3)
(CCI-Df.4)
Ex@t =df. - (Vy)Dxy@t
Pxy@t =df. Ex@t-Ey@t-(Vz)@zy@t-+Dzx@t)
Oxy@t =df. (3z)(Pzx@t-Pzy@t)
FuxS@t =df. Ex@t-(Vy)(Dyx@tc.
(Vz)[(zES-Ez@t)-Dyz@t])
The Calculus contains the following distinctive axioms:
(CCI-Ax. 1) The Overlap Axiom:
Oxy@t -- Dxy@t
8 I have changed the notation to conform to the notation
in the rest of this paper.
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(CCI-Ax.2) The Identity Axiom:
x=y (Vt) [(Ex@tvEy@t)-* (Pxy@t-Pyx@t)]
(CCI-Axs.3) The Fusion Axioms:
For any set of n sets, Sl,....Sn, if n=l,
(3.1) (3x)(xES-Ex@t)-+(3y)FuyS@t, if n=2
(3.2) t1 #t2 (1x)(xES-Ex@t 1 )-(3y)(yES 2 -Ey@t2
(3z)(FuzS1@t 1-Fuz S2@t2
(and so on for n > 2)
The identity axiom of Thomson's Cross-Temporal Calculus
of Individuals marks the most significant departure from the
Revised Calculus of Individuals I discussed in the previous
section; in particular, its consequence that
(29) (Vt)[(Ex@tvEy@t)-+)Pxy@t-Pyx@t)]-x=y
is noteworthy. Under its intended interpretation, it says
that any material objects x, and y are identical if at all
times at which either x or y exists, x and y are parts of each
other. In contrast, an analogue, in the language of the Cross-
Temporal Calculus, of the old axiom of identity of the Revised
Calculus is:
(30) (Vt)[[(Ex@tvEy@t)-+ (Pxy@t-Pyx@t)]-+x=y]
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or equivalently:
(31) (3t)[(Ex@tvEy@t) -+ (Pxy@t-Pyx@t)]+x=y
Clearly, the weaker (29) does not entail (30). Unlike (30),
(29) does not have the consequence that distinct objects are not
part of each other at any time. I argued in the previous
section that the intended interpretation of the Revised Calculus
of Individuals is not in conflict with their being distinct
individuals which fuse the same set at different times. The
intended interpretation of Thomson's Cross-Temporal Calculus
of Individuals is not in conflict with there being distinct
individuals which fuse the same set at a time. It is this
feature of Thomson's Cross-Temporal Calculus of Individuals
which allows us to resolve our problem of identity across time.
Our problem, it will be remembered, arose as follows: We
supposed that A, the set of thirty links and a clasp, is at t
fused by the silver chain on my table at t1 . At t1 , another
object, Alpha, fused a proper subset of A, i.e. B, the set of
twenty-nine links and a clasp which remain on the table from
t1 through t2 . We are inclined to say that the silver chain on
my table at t1 survived the removal of a link between t1 and t2'
and that at t2 it fuses B. But we are also inclined to say that
Alpha fuses B at t2 However, if the axioms of the Revised
Calculus of Individuals are true under their intended interpre-
149
tation and Alpha and the silver chain on my table at t1 each
fuses B at t2 , then they are identical. But that is not true,
since they fuse different sets at t1 .
Now, unlike the Revised Calculus of Individuals, the
Cross-Temporal Calculus of Individuals does not have the
consequence that if any objects x, and y fuse the same set at
some time then x is identical with y. Hence, if the logic of
parthood is the Cross-Temporal Calculus of Individuals, we may
consistently affirm that Alpha and the silver chain on my table
at t are distinct but that they fuse the same set at t2'
It should be noticed that for the logic of parthood to be
the Cross-Temporal Calculus of Individuals it is not sufficient
that the axioms of this calculus, and in particular the axiom of
identity, be true under their intended interpretation; it is also
required that the stronger axiom of the Revised Calculus of
Individuals, i.e.
(31) (3t)[(Ex@tvEy@t)-+ (Pxy@t-Pys@t)]-+x=y
or the theorem that
(32) (3t)[(Ex@tvEy@t)-+(FuxS-FuyS)]+-x=y
be false under their intended interpretation.
Now, the claim that (31) or (32) are not true under their
intended interpretation gives rise to a difficulty which, I
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think, deserves our attention. For if (31) or (32) are not true
(under their intended interpretation) then there are distinct
individuals which fuse the same set at a given time. Alpha and
the silver chain on my table at t, according to the proposal
we are considering, are such individuals. Now I have frequently
used the expression 'the silver chain on my table at tl',
implying that at t there was only one silver chain on my table.
Considering the case that I have described, it would be very
natural to say, as indeed I do, that there is only one silver
chain on my table at t2 as well. But if I am right in thinking
that there is only one silver chain on my table at t2, then,
since Alpha is on the table at t2, Alpha is not a silver chain.
However, Alpha occupies exactly the same place as a silver chain,
it has the same parts as a silver chain, and these parts are put
together in exactly the same way as the parts of a silver chain.
What, then, prevents Alpha from being a silver chain?
It seems that if (32) is false under its intended inter-
pretation then a problem of a very general nature arises. For
if (32) is false under the intended interpretation then presuma-
bly it is true of a very large class of count nouns that either
it is not sufficient for a member of this class to correctly
apply to an individual that the individual has a specified
shape, or size or parts of a specified kind; or it correctly
applies to two or more individuals which occupy exactly the
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same place at a given time. Now, it might be suggested that,
for instance, what prevents Alpha from being a silver chain at
t2 is its history. It would be said that Alpha is not a silver
chain at t2 because it was not a silver chain at t1 ; and that
it was not a silver chain at t1 because at t1 it was a proper
part of something which at t1 was a silver chain. I think that
this is not a satisfactory explanation. Evidently, not every
substitution instance of the schemas
(i) (Vx)(x is an F at t-+(Vt')(x exists at t'
-+ x is an F at t'))
and
(ii) (Vx)(x is an F at t-+x is not, at t, a proper part
of anything which is an F at t),
where 'F' is replaced by a count noun, is true. (ii) yields a
falsehood on substitution of 'building' for 'F', and (i) yields
a falsehood on substitution for 'F' of 'philosopher' and 'long
silver chain'. But then what reason is there for thinking that
both (i) and (ii) yield truths on substitution for 'F' of
'silver chain'? I am inclined to think that no satisfactory
answer to this question is available. Therefore I am inclined
to think that if we are prepared to say that the silver chain
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on my table at t1 survived the removal of a link, then we had
better accept that Alpha is also a silver chain.
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